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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CONDUIT BOND FINANCING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS—
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE U.S. AND CHINA
As an alternative way to issue bonds, conduit financing has been widely used by
local governments and nonprofit organizations. Conduit financing allows one entity to
issue debt on behalf of single or multiple borrowers. In the state of California in the U.S.,
a local agency is allowed to issue municipal bonds in compliance with law, but can also
borrow through a joint powers agency (JPA). In this case, the JPA serves as a conduit.
Conduit financing is preferred by local agencies in certain circumstances because it is
more convenient or fixed issuance costs can be split between several conduit borrowers
through bond pooling. In China, various Chinese local government issued debts through
the local government financial vehicles (LGFV); LGFV is viewed as a conduit. Conduit
operations, however, bring extra financial and administrative burdens. In this dissertation
I examine borrowing costs of local governments in the U.S. and in China, particularly
paying attention on debts issued through conduits.
The chapter 2 provides a background context and theoretical foundation of the
whole dissertation. In addition, two mechanisms--borrowing through JPAs in the U.S.
and through Chinese local government funding platforms will be compared to identify the
similarity and distinctive perspectives. Based on data from California Debt and
Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), the third chapter of my dissertation aims to
probe into two issues: (1) what drives local agencies to use conduit? (2) Did conduit
financing produce lower TIC than other revenue bonds? The emergence and existence of
this type of conduit is profoundly historical and political. One reason for this is
informational asymmetry in the municipal bond market. The disclosure requirements of
the municipal bond market are weaker than the corporate bond market, and plenty of
small issuers are less known by municipal bond investors. Although bond pooling
provided by conduits is supposed to lower borrowing costs, most bonds issued by JPAs
finance a single local agency. Therefore, it is important to investigate the incentives for
these local agencies to use conduits instead of arm’s-length investors. As a matter of fact,
during the borrowing process, the JPA is a type of financial intermediary that can
reorganize small issues more efficiently. Hence, sophisticated local agencies with strong

backgrounds prefer to borrow directly from the credit market under their name. To avoid
selection bias and potential endogeneity problems, a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regression will be used. My empirical results show that ceteris paribus, TICs of
California local governments are significantly reduced through conduit financing.
Chapter 4 focuses on Chinese local government debts issued through the local
government financial vehicles (LGFV). Specifically, this chapter addresses two questions:
(1) in Chinese quasi-municipal credit markets, is there any evidence that the quasimunicipal bond market is influenced by market principles? (2) How are borrowing price,
borrowing volume, and infrastructure expenditure interconnected? Using data from 2007
to 2012, through a simultaneous equation model, I found that the municipal credit system
in China has the mixed characteristics of relationship-based and market-based systems;
and that the available fiscal resources and debt have a complementary relationship.
To my knowledge, there are very few studies that consider drivers of debt
financing choices of local governments and empirically examined the impact of conduit
financing on their borrowing costs. My research seeks to bridge this gap. Since most
local governments have been burdened with heavy debts, understanding how the conduit
financing fiscally influence local governments is very important.
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Marks-Roos bonds, Chinese
urban investment bonds
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Chapter 1 Overview of Dissertation

Introduction
Municipal bonds have been widely used since the 1800s, playing an important
role in fiscal management and economic development. Municipal bond financing gives
state and local governments more resources for building infrastructure and investing in
capital projects, makes living environments more convenient, and can potentially
stimulate economies. The two most commonly used types of municipal bonds are the
general obligation bond (GO bond) and the revenue bond. Most GO bonds are secured by
the full faith and credit of the issuer, require voter approval prior to issuance, and are
usually paid from the general funds of the issuer, depending on state or local laws. GO
bonds usually obtain very high credit ratings and are viewed as the safest type of bond
aside from treasury bonds. On the other hand, revenue bonds are backed and paid from a
specific source of revenue that varies from case to case. “Pledged revenues may be
derived from operation of the financed project, grants, or excise or other specified nonad-valorem taxes. Generally, no voter approval is required prior to issuance of such
obligations.” 1 Revenue bonds are more complicated than GO bonds, and their credit risks
depend on repayment sources and the revenues specifically pledged in the contract. This
leads to a large range of credit ratings and borrowing costs. Those investing in revenue
bonds therefore take the risk that the pledged revenues may not be sufficiently profitable
to repay them, as they have no legal recourse to the state’s general funds or tax revenues.

1

The definition is from the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. For more information, see:
http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/REVENUE-BOND.aspx
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Thus, revenue bonds generally obtain lower credit ratings and bear higher interest costs
than GO bonds. Local governments utilize both GO bonds and revenue bonds to finance
public goods.
After two hundred years of development, municipal bonds have become so
abundant and diverse that various categories have developed, each providing different
financing methods. Among them, local governments and nonprofit organizations have
used conduit debt financing as an alternative to other common issuance methods. Conduit
debt financing allows one entity to issue debt on behalf of one or multiple governments.
The creation of conduit debt financing was intended to promote the utilization of bond
pooling in order to reduce local borrowing costs. However, issuers are required to pay a
substantial amount of issuance costs. Since many local governments often carry heavy
debts, it is important to investigate whether or not conduit debt financing actually
decreases their borrowing costs. In this dissertation, I examine conduit financing in the
context of local governments in the U.S. and China, paying particular attention to MarksRoos bonds and Chinese urban investment bonds.
This chapter will explain the motivation for the study, define the major research
questions examined in the three chapters that follow, and describe the overall
organization of this dissertation.

Motivation
Although debt financing broadens the financing channel of local governments and
contributes to economic and social development, there is a downside: debt can be a
2

serious problem if it gets out of control. This concern about risk has been present since
the origin of municipal bonds. State and local governments can be subject to balanced
budget requirements, competition between comparable jurisdictions, and the influence of
federal policies. The question of how to use municipal bonds wisely and constrain the
level of debt within the affordability scope has been a point of considerable interest for
public finance researchers.
Conduit financing provides an alternative way for local governments to access
credit markets and potentially reduces borrowing costs, but it is also a high-risk bond
type. Investment in conduit bonds reduces significantly during financial crises, and the
default rates of conduit bonds are higher than average municipal bonds. To my
knowledge, there is a dearth of studies on conduit financing. This dissertation seeks to fill
this gap, that is, to contribute research on the municipal bonds of local governments
issued through conduits in the U.S. and through Chinese local government funding
platforms, a similar mechanism.

Research Question
The broad purpose of this dissertation is to explore the role of conduit financing in
the municipal bond market. The chapter 2 provides background, context, and the
theoretical foundation of the whole dissertation. It includes the following main sections:
the definition of conduits; description of types of different conduits; focus on a particular
type of conduit financing in which a conduit agency issues bonds and passes the proceeds
to local government. Two cases are explained in detail: Marks-Roos Bonds (MRBs) in
3

California and Chinese urban investment bonds (UIBs). I examine the motivation for
using conduits and outline the key characteristics of conduit bonds. Furthermore, I
analyze MRBs and UIBs in order to compare and contrast the perspectives of these two
mechanisms.
The third chapter of my dissertation will explore two questions: (1) what drives
local agencies to use conduits, and (2) did conduits save money for local agencies or cost
more? Although bond pooling provided by conduits is supposed to lower borrowing costs,
most of the bonds issued by JPAs finance, a single local agency. It is important to
investigate the incentives of these local agencies to use conduits instead of arm’s length
investors, and whether or not conduit financing reduces borrowing costs.
The forth chapter focuses on Chinese local government debts issued through local
government financial vehicles (LGFV). Specifically, this chapter addresses two questions:
(1) in Chinese quasi-municipal credit markets, is there any evidence that market
principles influence the quasi-municipal bond market? (2) How are borrowing price,
borrowing volume, and infrastructure expenditure interconnected? Using data from 2007
to 2012 and applying a simultaneous equation model, I found that the municipal credit
system in China has the mixed characteristics of relationship-based and market-based
systems, and that available fiscal resources and debt have a complementary relationship.
Apparently, due to highly different credit systems in the U.S. and China, it is reasonable
to expect distinct credit system operations. Because of this, the mechanisms that have
been documented in the U.S. do not necessarily work well in China. At the moment, the
Chinese central government is arranging for the extensive use of municipal bonds.
4

Concerns about financial vehicles, including the lack of transparency and weak risk
management practices of Chinese subnational governments, keep rising and are attracting
attention from both scholars and practitioners. This analysis provides some evidence of
market development status, which is the foundation of future research and policy making.

Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The second chapter provides a
definition of conduit financing, as well as an overview of background, context, and major
features. Additionally, two mechanisms – conduit financing in the U.S. and borrowing
through Chinese local government funding platforms – will be compared to identify the
similarities and differences of these perspectives. In the third chapter, I test the
hypotheses of debt financing choices and the impact of TIC through an empirical analysis
using data from the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC),
which covers all municipal bonds issued by California local governments from 1984 to
2016. In chapter four, I conduct an empirical analysis on Chinese local government debts
issued through local government financial vehicles (LGFV), in which I apply a
simultaneous equation model to data from 2007 to 2012. Finally, chapter five concludes
by addressing the policy implications of my major findings.

5

Chapter 2 Conduit Financing -- What is It and How does It Work?

Introduction
Conduit financing, which allows one entity to issue debt on behalf of one or
multiple governments, provides an alternative way for local governments to access credit
markets and potentially reduces borrowing costs. But conduit operation brings additional
financial and administrative burdens. Local governments do not have to borrow from
conduits – joint powers agencies; rather, they can approach investors directly by issuing
municipal bonds. Conduit financing, however, provides extra benefits that are valuable to
local agencies.
To my knowledge, there are only a limited number of studies on conduit financing.
This chapter provides this dissertation’s background, context, and theoretical foundation.
First, it reviews the definition of conduits and describes the different types of conduits;
then, it provides an analysis of the motivation for using conduits, and describes key
characteristics such as who is using conduits, what role do they play, and the
responsibility of paying conduit debts. Furthermore, MRBs and UIBs are compared to
identify the similarities and differences of the perspectives presented by these two
mechanisms. Finally, this chapter is intended to provide an objective picture of how
conduit financing has been used and to facilitate discussion surrounding the costs and
benefits of using conduit financing.

6

Definition and Categories of Conduits
The word “conduit” has various definitions and meanings. Merriam-Webster
defines a conduit as “someone or something that is used as a way of sending something
(such as information or money) from one place or person to another.” Conduit financing
is when an entity sends money as a bridge between two other parties. Scholars in the
fields of finance, economics, and public administration have all studied conduits with
different purposes and emphases.
In finance literature, a “conduit” refers to “a financial organization or entity
whose business purpose is to buy loans or other financial assets from correspondents,
with the goal of earning a profit by repackaging and selling the assets as securities (Elmer,
1999). In other words, finance literature views a “conduit” as “a type of business that
specializes in securitizing loans and other types of financial assets.” In general, conduits
buy or generate loans at low prices from mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, banks,
thrifts, or secondary markets. They then sell them at high prices as securities to securities
brokers and dealers, or as whole loans to secondary markets. This type of conduit has
existed in the finance field since the early 1980s. Finance scholars believe that conduits
are not just simple arbitrages. They also bring their expertise and bear risks.
Economics literature studies conduit countries from a tax perspective.
Multinational companies shift their income from high to low tax jurisdictions, and
conduit countries are used for this purpose. Conduit countries have “both large capital
outﬂows and inﬂows (not just one or the other). Some of these countries have special
laws, such as bank secrecy (Switzerland and Luxembourg), a strong judicial system (the
7

United Kingdom) and corporate governance rules (Delaware in the United States) that
encourage companies to set up holding companies in their jurisdictions (Mintz, 2004).”
Other countries “have a tax regime that encourages investment ﬂows through them that
enables multinationals to substantially reduce taxable income on a worldwide basis.”
These scholars discuss reasons of emerge, the revenue costs of governments, and
allocation efficiency and its implications (Mintz and Smart, 2004; Andersson and Fall,
2001; Mintz, 2004).
In the public administration field, scholars discuss conduit financing in the form
of private activity bonds 2. A state or local governmental entity can issue private activity
bonds and “passes the proceeds through to businesses and individuals for their private use
in the hope of spurring economic development (Zimmerman, 1989).” The use of this form
of conduit financing became widespread in the late 1960s and attracted the attention of
the federal government. Since it is believed that many of the services funded by private
activity bonds “provide minimal or no benefits to Federal taxpayers,” this financing form
makes it so the “Federal government loses its ability to control its budget,” and considers
“tax-exempt bonds as a substitute for taxable debt.” This shows the “inefficiency of tax
exemption as a subsidy” and “reduce[s] the progressivity of the income tax.” Congress
and the Treasury Department interfered with the use of private activity bonds by
enforcing a series of laws and regulations such as the Revenue and Expenditure Control
Act of 1968, the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980,

2

More
information
about
private
activity
bonds
http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/PRIVATE-ACTIVITY-BOND-_PAB_.aspx
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please

see

the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.
An example of conduits is special purpose entities. A variety of states “special
purpose entities” or SPEs are created as “enterprises” to run state programs as an integral
part of state government. These types of state SPEs typically finance their operations by
issuing revenue bonds (also called revenue debt), repayable solely from the profits of the
enterprise. Investors in those bonds therefore take the risk that the enterprise will be
insufficiently profitable to repay them. They generally have no legal recourse to the
state’s general funds or tax revenues, and thus the bonds “are not considered state debt.”
These SPE had been created in every state by the 1980s (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1983). State governments have delivered numerus public services through SPEs for a
long time.
There are various categories of conduit financing, and it is impossible to cover all
of them thoroughly. In this study, I investigate a particular category of conduits: when an
entity issues debt on behalf of one or multiple local governments. To be more specific,
the primary subjects of this dissertation are Marks-Roos Bonds in California, U.S.A., and
Chinese Urban Investment Bonds, which I will discuss in the following sections.
Marks-Roos Bonds in California
Marks-Roos Bonds (MRBs) are bonds issued by joint powers authorities (JPAs)
under the Marks-Roos Local Bond Act of 1985(Article 4 of the Joint Exercise of Powers
Authority law), the proceeds of which are passed to local governments to finance a wide
variety of purposes. JPAs can loan the proceeds to local governments or buy whole
9

municipal bonds issued by local governments using the proceeds of MRBs. In this case,
the joint powers agency serves as a conduit and is called the conduit issuer. The local
agency borrowing money through a JPA is called the conduit borrower.
Regarding debt limits, the Marks-Roos Act does not impose additional restrictions
on conduit borrowers: “the form of the loan agreement between a JPA and local agency
in each instance is tailored to the restrictions on indebtedness faced by the local agency
obligor, rather than any restrictions imposed by the Marks-Roos Act itself. The MarksRoos Act imposes minimal procedural requirements on the issuance of bonds” (Fong,
1998). The most common uses of the Marks-Roos Act include financing “public capital
improvements,” creating pooled bond issues, and financing working capital or insurance
programs. Only JPAs can issue MRBs (Lockyer, 2006; Fong, 1998).
JPAs are special government entities created under the Joint Exercise of Powers
Authority Law. “Joint powers are exercised when the public officials of two or more
agencies agree to create another legal entity or establish a joint approach to work on a
common problem, fund a project, or act as a representative body for a specific activity”
(California State Legislature, 2007). Joint powers can be exercised only through a joint
powers agreement, or if the member agencies create a new, independent government
organization. This government organization is known as a JPA, which is legally
independent of the member agencies, but shares powers common to them. Joint powers
are defined in the joint powers agreement. According to the California State Legislature,
the “Agencies that can exercise joint powers include federal agencies, state departments,
counties, cities, special districts, school districts, redevelopment agencies, and even other
10

joint powers organizations.” They also point out: “a California agency can even share
joint powers with an agency in another state. JPAs are commonly used in areas such as
groundwater management, road construction, habitat conservation, airport expansion,
redevelopment projects, stadium construction, mental health facilities construction,
educational programs, employee benefits services, insurance coverage, and regional
transportation projects” (California State Legislature, 2007). In addition to the JPAs that
handle these projects, there is also a kind of JPA created specifically for capital financing
by issuing bonds. This is called a public financing authority.
Chinese Urban Investment Bonds (UIBs)
The State Council defines Local Government Funding Platforms (LGFPs) as legal
entities founded by local governments and their subsidiaries by means of financial
appropriation or asset injection (such as land, equity, etc.), specializing in funding,
investing, constructing, and operating public or quasi-public projects commissioned by
local governments (Wu, 2010).” LGFPs usually include many companies that are devoted
to a specific purpose. These are called urban investment companies, such as the Shanghai
Urban Construction Investment and Development Corporation. The bonds issued by
these urban investment companies are called urban investment bonds (UIBs), which are
considered quasi-municipal bonds. He and Man (2012) provide further explanations:
“These quasi-public agencies generally are incorporated as different investment
companies in order to finance and invest as a commercial entity. The state and local
governments backed these financing platforms by imputing hard assets, such as land,
state-owned properties, and even revenue from fees and taxes. In other words, the state
and local governments bear certain liabilities to pay for the debt if the financing
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platforms fail to meet their engagements. So these debts are considered to be the “hidden
debt” of the SNGs although they are not included in the SNGs’ balance sheet.” 3
The State Council’s definition articulates that LGFPs have the following
characteristics:
First, it is the local governments and their subsidiaries that are actually in control
of the urban investment companies within LGFPSs. Most of the projects they operate are
nonprofit, though on the surface they often look like for-profit companies.
Second, the local government’s investments usually include “financial
appropriation or asset injection.” Financial appropriation involves the authorization of
fiscal resources, and asset injections are the investment of nonfinancial assets such as
land, stock rights or charge rights. Each LGFP utilizes a mix of financial appropriation
and asset injection activities.
Third, the LGFPs’ services for “public or quasi-public projects,” like
“constructing the infrastructures and properties, supporting facilities, communications
and transportation, and so on” are “commissioned by the local governments.”
Forth, LGFPs are independent legal entities. Most of them are limited liability
companies, as are general trading companies such as construction investment companies,
state-owned property operation companies, and industry investment companies such as
water utility companies and transportation companies (Ministry of Finance, Development
and Reform Commission, People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory
Commission, 2010). It is important to emphasize that, despite being considered

3

SNGs refer to local governments in this dissertation.
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independent legal entities, LGFPs benefit from potential credit enhancements supported
by local governments; in other words, these entities integrate government credits and
commercial credits. In the early stages of an LGFP’s development, local governments
usually inject assets to make the platforms bigger, and may also provide guarantee
documents if necessary. Figure 2.1 shows the operation forms of LGFPs.
The 4 trillion yuan economic stimulus plan includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local
governments’ revenue and the matching funds, the central bank and China Banking
Regulatory Commission provided some solutions, offering conditional support to local
governments in establishing the funding platforms, issuing enterprise bonds, mediumterm notes, and using other financing instruments to broaden the financing channels (The
People’s Bank of China, China banking regulatory commission, 2009). This kind of bond
is called an urban investment bond and is viewed as quasi-municipal bond. As the
municipal credit market expanded, many of the Chinese local governments took on large
amounts debt. Along with this debt, new issues and concerns appeared, such as a high
debt ratio and inadequate repayment abilities. In response, the central government began
a series of reforms to prevent the potential municipal debt crisis. Since then, China’s local
government funding platforms have become a high-priority social and economic issue.
The regulatory supervision of quasi-municipal bonds in China is similar to enterprise
bonds. They are subject to similar taxes and regulations as the enterprise bonds issued by
for-profit corporations and are placed off-budget, which means that these debts are not
reported in the same way as other municipal debts. This means that the Chinese
budgeting and government accounting system does not officially provide any information
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about the magnitude of these contingent debts. This arrangement ignores the objective
needs presented by the development of municipal debt and that it will bring potential
economic risks to both the central and local governments.
LGFPs are creations of Chinese local governments and have different degrees of
dependency on their parental governments. The relationships between LGFPs and their
parental governments mainly depend on the leading departments of the urban investment
companies’ executive, as well as the social status of the corporate executives involved. If
their parental government agencies are important departments and are in charge of
principal leaders of the municipal government or the Department of Finance, that LGFP
would be very likely to receive strong government support. The social status of the
corporate executives is also an important factor: if the corporate executives are also
principal government leaders or former principal government leaders, then the possibility
of access to government support is greater. Figure 2.1 below presents the operation form
of LGFP, which shows the close connections between urban development and
construction companies and parental governments. Figure 2.2 presents the operation
structure of quasi-municipal bonds.
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Figure 2.1 Operation Forms of China’s Local Government Funding Platforms

As quasi-public agencies, the city investment companies incorporated in LGFPs
do not have the right to levy taxes. In China, official central and local governments
reserve this right. LGFPs exist only to solve capital shortage problems for the local
governments and to provide public services.
Figure 2.2 The Operation Structure of Quasi-municipal Bonds
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This section summarizes five categories of conduit financing and focuses on a
particular category of conduits in which an entity issues debt on behalf of one or multiple
local governments: MRBs in California, U.S.A., and UIBs in China. In the following,
detailed analysis of MRBs will be illustrated. MRBs will then be compared with UIBs to
illustrate their characteristics further.

Background of MRB
This section reviews the motivation of utilizing MRBs and outlines the key
characteristics of MRBs. MRBs are issued under the Marks-Roos Bond Act of 1985.
Their issuance has been increasing gradually since 1986. MRBs are typically considered
to be relatively risky. The issuance MRBs is reduced significantly during economic
downturns, as the two figures below illustrate. Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show the
principal amount and numbers of issuance of MRBs. The blue bar indicates the actual
number of MRBs, and the orange curve indicates their percentage compared to the whole
long-term municipal bond market.
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Figure 2.3 Principal Amount of Long-term MRBs in 1986-2015
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Figure 2.4 Number of Issuances of Long-term MRBs
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Motivation of Utilizing MRB
The motivation to engage in MRBs has been presented in several ways. The
enactment of the Marks-Roos Local Bond Act of 1985 was meant to facilitate bond
17

pooling, which would lower the costs of issuance (Lockyer, 2006). Bond pooling is
especially useful when the par value of new issuance is small since a certain amount of
fixed costs can be spread across different issues. Fixed issuance costs do not increase
proportionally with the bond’s principal amount. Hence, MRBs are a greater burden for
small issues than large issues. Small issues can benefit from economies of scale by
entering a bond pooling through JPAs.
Another motivation to engage in MRBs is enhanced marketability. On the one
hand, JPAs have issued many bonds and built a relatively good reputation. Compared to
small local agencies, investors are more familiar with JPAs. It has been documented that
an issuers’ reputation influences borrowing costs. Typically, the use of MRBs is expected
to result in lower borrowing costs than common municipal bonds issued by local agencies.
On the other hand, in many cases, besides MRBs, local agencies can only issue
certificates of participation (COP) 4. It is believed that investors are more likely to accept
Marks-Roos bonds than COPs. Therefore, conduit financing can potentially decrease
local agencies’ borrowing costs because of marketability.
The third motivation for local governments to use MRBs is the flexibility in
issuance. MRBs issuance only requires a JPA passing a resolution. Voter approval is not
required, which grants local governments more flexibility. However, the JPA has to

4

A typical certificate of participation (COP) is “An instrument evidencing a pro rata share in a specific
pledged revenue stream, usually lease payments by the issuer that are typically subject to annual
appropriation. The certificate generally entitles the holder to receive a share, or participation, in the
payments from a particular project. The payments are passed through the lessor to the certificate holders.
The lessor typically assigns the lease and the payments to a trustee, which then distributes the payments to
the certificate holders (Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, MSRB).” By investing a COP, investors
(the certificate holders) are eligible to receive a share in the payments from a project associated with this
COP. The proceeds of the sale of the COPs are used to finance the project.
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prove that the debt financing would generate significant public benefits before
authorizing a new issuance. Some research on the role of public authorities in municipal
capital markets states that public authorities are “borrowing machines” (Leigland, 1994;
Davis, 1935), circumventing “many of rules that constrain general-purpose governments,
such as voter approval and debt limits (Robbins & Simonsen, 2012).” It has also been
suggested that conduit financing through public authorities “provides the legal framework
for borrowing large sums of money (CDAC, 1993).” Revenue cuts due to changes in law
and reduced federal aid promote this motivation. “In 1978, Californians enacted
Proposition 13, which limited the ability of local public agencies to increase property
taxes based on a property’s assessed value (California Tax Data).” Proposition 13, along
with “sharp cuts in federal aid to state and local governments,” significantly “limited
local government’s ability to fund public infrastructure.” As something of a response, the
Marks-Roos Bond Pooling Act (Government Code §6584-6599.1) was created in 1985
“to provide a flexible alternative method of financing needed improvements, along with
the benefit of reduced borrowing costs through the use of bond pools.”
To sum up, the motivation of utilizing MRBs is to obtain greater financing
flexibility at lower borrowing costs compared to the interests paid in the absence of the
Marks-Roos Act.
Key Characteristics of MRB
Players
Federal agencies, state departments, counties, cities, special districts, school
districts, redevelopment agencies, and even other joint powers organizations can establish
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JPAs. JPAs may issue debt under the Mark-Roos Bond Pooling Act of 1985 to purchase
municipal bonds from local agencies or make loans to them. Local agencies such as cities,
counties, Mello-Roos community facilities districts, and special districts can be conduit
borrowers or local obligors.
Role of JPA
JPAs play three important roles in conduit financing: producing information,
providing potential enhancement, and promoting bond pooling. Before authorizing a new
issuance, the JPA has to prove that debt financing would generate significant public
benefits. The close relationships between JPAs and local agencies give the JPAs more
opportunities to gain information about conduit borrowers’ qualities, even including
some private information. Compared to a single local agency, especially a small one,
JPAs usually have higher levels of management expertise, along with professional
financial teams. This information could be used during the issuances of new MRBs. A
number of conduit borrowers are small local agencies that may be unfamiliar to investors.
In contrast, JPAs have usually built a strong reputation. These local agencies gain
potential reputation enhancement from JPAs by using MRBs instead of directly issuing
bonds themselves. Furthermore, JPAs are platforms for bond pooling, which can
potentially reduce the borrowing costs due to issuance economies of scale.
Responsibility of paying MRB
In general, conduit financing is secured by the conduit borrower's credit, and the
obligators are local agencies involved in the MRBs. JPAs are not responsible for the
repayment of the debts. Rather, JPAs act “as a conduit issuer for the local agency and
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[have] no obligation on the bonds other than to make payment from the payments
received under the underlying agreement with the local agency (Fong, 1998).” In these
situations, “the source of revenues for the underlying agreement with the local agency
can vary greatly and will determine which type of agreement will likely be used.”
Although JPAs, unlike insurance companies, do not have to pay the obligation in the
event of default, they should avoid it regardless, as default would harm a JPA’s
reputation.

Comparison of the MRB and the UIB
This section compares the MRB and the UIB from five perspectives. The key
difference is that MRB is a municipal bond, and UIB is essentially a corporate bond.
Issuing Purpose
MRBs are used for a variety of purposes. Figure 2.5 below presents a summary of
principal amount with respect to MRB issuance for the 1985-2016 period. The largest
category in terms of principal amounts is “multiple capital improvements,” which
includes a variety of categories 5 . The term “multiple capital improvements” does not
specify the actual purpose of issuing; for example, this category may include exhibition
buildings, police stations, and fire stations.

5

For a list and example of “multiple capital improvements” please see California Debt and Investment
Advisory Commission (CDIAC), California debt issuance primer, 2006, page 146.
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Figure 2.5 Principle Amount by Purposes of MRBs

Sum of Principal Amounts(in million dollars)
Multiple Capital Improvements, Public…
Redevelopment, Multiple Purposes
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Other Capital Improvements, Public Works
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Street Construction and Improvements
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UIBs usually finance “public or quasi-public projects commissioned by local
governments,” such as constructing infrastructure and properties, supporting facilities,
communications, and transportation, and so on. Urban investment bonds mainly focus on
urban infrastructure construction.
Tax-exempt Status
For tax purposes, municipal bonds in the U.S. can be classified into two
categories: tax-exempt or taxable. “Qualifying municipal bonds are tax-exempt, which
means that the interest earned on these bonds is exempt from federal (and usually state)
income tax (Dwight, 2012).” Most MRBs are tax-exempt. MRBs do not have unique
federal tax issues, but, like other common municipal bonds, are subject to federal tax
limitations and the requirements of local governments, such as limitations relating to
private activity bonds, arbitrage bonds, and hedge bonds (Lockyer, 2006).
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In China, there is no specific tax-exemption policy for either issuers or investors
of UIBs. Urban investment companies need to pay corporate taxes, just like other general,
for-profit companies; the bondholders also have to pay income tax. While at this stage,
the government gives these urban investment enterprises various tax preferential policies
as a form of subsidy.
Types of Securities
Marks-Roos Act does not specify a revenue source that must be pledged as
security for MRBs, and MRBs may potentially be secured by any local agency’s revenue
sources, regardless of whether it is tax, fee, or another revenue source. Thus, MRBs
involve a variety of debt types. Figure 2.6 below presents four categories of debt type
based on a summary of the principal amount of MRB issuance for the 1985-2016 period.
The largest category in terms of principal amounts is “special assessment bond”; the
source of repayment for this category is the special assessment payments that secure
assessment bonds. The JPA purchases assessment bonds using the proceeds of its MRBs,
and the debt service’s payments on assessment bonds flow through the JPA to the
bondholders of MRBs. Again, “the use of special assessment is restricted by law to public
improvements that provide a direct benefit to the assessed property” (Fong, 1998).
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Figure 2.6 Principle Amount by Bond Type of MRBs

Sum of Principal Amounts (in million dollars)
Special assessment bond
Revenue bond
Tax allocation bond
Marks-Roos Authority Loan
0.00

50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 300.00 350.00 400.00

Data source: The California State Treasure

In China, local governments have issued many UIBs as “quasi-municipal bonds”
through LGFPs. These bonds usually tie into certain projects such as utility services or
public transportation. Some bonds are for paid by the revenue of these projects, but in
most cases, local governments allocate funds annually to establish a certain amount of
special sinking funds in order to purchase special services or to dedicate certain special
revenues (such as a specific area of land premium) for the repayment of debt funding.
This means these bonds are partially supported by local governments’ tax revenues.
Because platform companies lack operating assets, either asset disposal will occur or
third party guarantors will have to deal with the compensatory situation in the event that
the issuers of such bonds are unable to pay the principal and interest of the source of
funds. Quasi-municipal bonds could be considered as a mix of revenue bonds and GO
bonds/public funds. In general, such bonds do not fit easily into either category.
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Method of Sale
Three methods of sale are used for MSBs: competitive sale, negotiated sale, and
private placement. In the U.S.A., large issuers with a strong credit rating (and strong
market) usually tend to use competitive bids. Issuers use negotiated bonds sales to get
more flexibility for timing and marketing the issuance.
In China, competitively bids are widely used; however, negotiated bond sales
exist as well, usually called “Private Placement Notes.” PPNs are usually issued to
specific institutional investors in the inter-bank bond market by way of the non-public
issuance of debt. On April 29, 2011, China’s National Association of Financial Market
Institutional Investors (NAFMII) released "inter-bank bond market, non-financial
corporate debt financing instruments [and] non-public private placement rules." On May
4, 2011, the inter-bank bond market launched the first non-public debt financing
instruments.

Conclusion and Policy Implication
This chapter reviews the background context and provides analysis of the
motivation for using conduits, as well as their key characteristics. MRBs and UIBs are
compared to identify the similarities and differences of the two mechanism’s perspectives.
This chapter is intended to provide an objective picture of how conduit financing has
been used, and to facilitate discussions about the costs and benefits of using conduit
financing. Conduit financing provides an alternative method for the local agencies to
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finance public projects, offers more flexibility, and potentially reduces local agencies’
borrowing costs.
Are stricter regulations needed to curb abusive transactions in conduit financing?
There is no easy answer. As a matter of fact, regulations related to MRBs and UIBs have
been amended. In California, the Marks-Roos Act has changed to “curb the imposition of
excessive fees, to severely restrict blind pools, and to outlaw Roving JPAs” (Fong, 1998).
Fong believes that the current problem stems from “a deficiency in [the] enforcement of
the law, rather than a flawed statute” (Fong, 1998). The California debt and investment
advisory commission “believes that the flexibility afforded by the Marks-Roos Act has
allowed local agencies to save time, money and effort in their issuance of bonds.
Moreover, there appears to be little to be gained by undertaking a major reform effort, as
what problems do exist are better addressed by law enforcement” (Fong, 1998).
According to Fong, the appropriate use of the Marks-Roos Act “provides a valuable tool
for local officials in carrying out their debt management duties.” On the other hand, along
with concerns regarding Chinese municipal debt after the 2008 financial crisis, the central
government is very determined to tighten the issuance and management of UIBs. To
control the risk of municipal debt, China’s State Council issued ‘notice on strengthening
management issues of local government financing platform’ in June of 2010, calling for
the constraints of local governments’ municipal debts. Additionally, the China Treasury
and other related committees put forward some implement measures in July.

6

Furthermore, the central government is actively moving to legalize the issuance of local
6

Shanghai Institute research group of state-owned capital operation. Shanghai local government investment
and financing platform for investment and financing mechanism’s innovation research [J]. Shanghai
Administration Institute, May 2012 Volume 13, No. 3, P59-70.
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governments’ municipal bonds to replace the “quasi-municipal bonds” role of UIB. In
fact, the central government amended the budget law about limitations on local
government bond issuance. Under the new budget law, the country's 31 provincial-level
administrative units and five municipalities can issue municipal bonds and do not have to
rely on debt financing through LGFP as of 2015, which many regard as a significant
change of budget law.
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Chapter 3 Does Conduit Financing Reduce Borrowing Costs of Local Governments?

Introduction
Municipal bonds have played an important role in fiscal management and
economic development. Municipal bond financing makes more resources available for
state and local governments to invest in infrastructure and capital projects. It can also
make living environments more convenient and potentially stimulate economies.
However, there are also drawbacks to municipal bond financing, as the debt it creates can
be a problem if it gets out of control. Concern about this kind of risk has been present
since the origin of municipal bonds. State and local governments might be subject to
balanced budget requirements, competition between comparable jurisdictions, and the
influence of federal policies. As a result, public finance researchers have considerable
interest in how to use municipal bonds wisely and constrain the level of debt within the
affordability scope.
A conduit, which allows one entity to issue debt on behalf of one or multiple
governments, provides an alternative way for local governments to access credit markets
and can potentially reduce borrowing costs. But conduit operation brings extra financial
and administrative burdens. Since most local governments carry heavy debts, it is
important to study whether or not conduit financing actually decreases their borrowing
costs. To my knowledge, there are very limited studies on conduit financing. This
dissertation seeks to bridge this gap.
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Two main questions need to be addressed: (1) what drives local agencies to use
conduits, and (2) did conduits save money for local agencies or cost more? Although
conduit financing is supposed to lower borrowing costs through bond pooling, most of
the bonds issued by JPAs are financed by a single local agency. It is important to
investigate the incentives of these local agencies to use conduits instead of arm’s length
investors, and whether or not conduit financing reduces borrowing costs.

Background
Marks-Roos Local Bonds (MRBs) are authorized by the Marks-Roos Local Bond
Act of 1985 (Article 4 of the Joint Exercise of Powers Authority law), which provides
joint powers authorities (JPA) with the general ability to issue bonds for a variety of
purposes. This legislation was enacted primarily to provide local agencies with the
opportunity to achieve issuance cost economies through bond pooling. However, its
actual usage has been broader, as its flexibility allows it to be used for single project
financing (Lockyer, 2006; Fong, 1998).
The most common uses of the Marks-Roos Act include financing “public capital
improvements,” creating pooled bond issues, and financing working capital or insurance
programs. Only JPAs may issue MRBs. JPAs are special government entities created
under the Joint Exercise of Powers Authority Law through an agreement between two or
more public agencies, who are considered JPA members.
CDIAC gives several reasons for why local agencies use JPAs, including the
flexibility of issuance, the marketing advantage provided by substituting bonds for COPs,
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and the ability to disperse fixed issuance costs through bond pools. The issuance of
MRBs requires only that a JPA pass a resolution. No voter approval is needed, which
grants local governments more flexibility. For example, redevelopment agencies
frequently issue MRB rather than traditional revenue bonds since they have to meet “a
competitive bid requirement on new issues and advance refundings of tax allocation
bonds under the Health & Safety Code (Fong, 1998).” Although the creation of a conduit
is intended to reduce local borrowing costs and to promote the utilization of bond pooling,
Robbins and Simonsen (2012) found that conduit bonds, based on data of Marks-Roos
Bonds in California from 2007 to 2009, pay higher interest costs and issuance costs.

Theoretical Framework
Municipal bonds differ on their interest rates or yields from one to another; one of
the most important reasons are varying degrees of default risks that they carry. “A default
is a situation when a debt obligation is not met, that is, the principal or interest payments
are not paid when they are due (Levine, Scorsone & Justice, 2012).” Accordingly, default
risk is the “issuer’s ability and willingness to make principal and interest payments on
time and in full (Johnson & Kriz, 2002).” All of municipal bonds are subject to default
risks, and therefore, issuers are required by investors to pay default risk premiums, which
are positively associated with their default risks. Specifically, a default risk premium is
defined as (Rose &Marquis, 2007):
Default risk premium =Promised yield on a risky asset – Risk-free interest rate
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where the promised yield on Promised yield on a risky asset is the yield to maturity of a
risky security; and the risk-free interest rate is the interest rate of a risk-free security, such
as treasury securities. A greater default risk is associated with a higher default risk
premium.
Interest rates of municipal bonds are clearly associated with risks. All investors of
municipal bonds face credit risk and market risk. The credit risk is the chance that the
obligor on municipal bonds will be unable to make the debt service payments; credit risk
is unique to a particular bond and is reflected in its bond rating (O'Hara，2011). Market
risk refers the potential price fluctuation of a bond due to changes in the market interest
rates, including inflation risk and liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is “the risk that an investor
may not be able to buy or sell a bond because there is no market for that bond at a
particular time (O'Hara，2011).” When investors believe that they carry more risks for
holding a particular municipal bond than other securities, they ask for a higher yield or
interest rate.
However, only the issuers know the true information about their default risk. They
have incentives to hold the bad information and only publish good information. Because
of the information asymmetry problem, investors of municipal bonds will always require
high yields if they cannot distinguish bonds between high and low default risks. High
quality debtors would go for other financing methods if they can reduce the costs. Finally,
only low quality debtors stay at the municipal bonds market, which cause the “lemon
problem.” Scholars and practitioners have been working to promote market transparency
and flow of information, to avoid this from happening.
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Information asymmetry is of greater concern for conduit bonds. While a local
agency is allowed to issue municipal bonds in compliance with the constitution and laws
within the debt limit, it also can borrow through a JPA. In this case, the joint powers
agency serves as a conduit, and is called the conduit issuer. The local agency that is
borrowing money through a JPA is called the conduit borrower 7. During the borrowing
process, a JPA, especially a public financing authority (formed solely for the purpose of
executing Marks-Roos bonds), serves as a type of financial intermediary. The emergence
and existence of this type of conduit are profoundly historical and political. One reason
for this is the asymmetry of information within the municipal bond market. The
disclosure requirements enforced by the municipal bond market are less strict than those
imposed by the corporate bond market, and many small issuers are less known by
municipal bond investors.
During the borrowing process, the JPA is a type of financial intermediary that can
reorganize small issuances more efficiently. Hence, sophisticated local agencies prefer to
borrow directly from the credit market under their name. They do not choose their debt
financing method randomly, which implies a selection bias. To deal with this problem, I
implement two-stage selection model. In the two sections that follow, I will analyze two
questions. The first section identifies what kinds of local agencies utilize the direct bond
issuing method. That is: what drives local agencies to use conduits? The second section
7

The MRSB website provides definitions and more information of related concepts: “the issuance of
municipal securities by a governmental unit (referred to as the “issuer” or “conduit issuer”) to finance a
project to be used primarily by a third party, which may be a for-profit entity engaged in private enterprise,
a 501(c)(3) organization, or another governmental entity (referred to as the “conduit borrower”). In a
conduit financing, the conduit borrower is liable for making debt service payments on the bonds. Industrial
development bonds, multi-family housing revenue bonds and qualified 501(c)(3) bonds are common types
of conduit financings. See: 501(c)(3); HOUSING REVENUE BOND – Multi-family housing revenue
bonds; INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND; PRIVATE ACTIVITY BOND.”
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examines whether or not conduit bonds bear greater or lesser costs than non-conduit
bonds.
Debt Financing Choices
Solutions to the rampant asymmetry of information within the municipal bond
market are in high demand. Credit rating agencies exist for this reason; they work as
certification agencies, which screen and sort debt issuers (Wakeman, 1981; Johnson,
1999; Johnson & Kriz, 2002). On one hand, credit rating agencies use their resources to
collect both available and non-published information on financial, economic,
administrative and other relevant attributes of debt issuers; on the other hand,
professionals in credit rating agencies process this information based on their financial
knowledge and provide sophisticated predictions of the issuers’ default risks. Similarly,
JPAs also screen MRBs issuers for “loose” certification. A potential advantage of JPAs is
that they are more likely to obtain private information by communicating regularly with
conduit borrowers.
Finance literature considers banks – a type of financial intermediary – to be good
reorganizers (Bolton and Sharfstein 1996; Gilson, Kose, and Lang 1990; Cantillo and
Wright 2000). The research of Cantillo and Wright (2000) is perhaps the most relevant.
They argue that financial intermediary theories “assume that intermediaries extract
information more efficiently than arm’s length investors, which implies that companies
with severe informational asymmetries borrow through banks.” Their empirical results
suggest that “intermediaries are indeed at an informational advantage over arm’s length
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investors, and that this advantage is best captured by a theory that sees banks as
reorganizers rather than as project screeners.”
The Marks-Roos Local Bond Pooling Act allows local agencies to borrow
through a JPA. The problem of information asymmetry is more severe in municipal bond
markets than in corporate bond markets, and financial intermediaries play a more
important role in extracting, reorganizing, and delivering information. Unlike banks,
JPAs absorb capital and make investments simultaneously.
Borrowing the theory of intermediaries’ reorganization from finance literature,
my model assumes that JPAs extract and reorganize information about local agencies
more efficiently than municipal bond investors and that these transaction costs can
decrease even further as a result of repeated coordination between JPAs and conduit
borrowers. This implies that borrowers with severe information asymmetry go to JPAs
and borrowers with less information asymmetry and avoid the extra intermediaries since
the extra fee they charge outweighs any potential benefit. Based on this line of reasoning,
I propose the following hypotheses:
First of all, it is generally known that high-quality borrowers are very unlikely to
default, and so they require less verification. Consequently, they can avoid JPAs to
reduce borrowing costs. Low-quality borrowers, however, are at a higher risk of
defaulting. They benefit from JPAs’ reorganization and verification, which entails lower
borrowing costs than directly tapping into municipal bondholders. Figure 3.1 shows that
although both issue methods charge more to low-quality borrowers, municipal
bondholders increase their rates faster than JPAs.
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Figure 3.1 Borrower Qualities and Interest Costs

Hypothesis 1: high-quality local agencies that are in great fiscal condition will
tap directly into the credit market. Low-quality local agencies, however, will use conduits.
Second, many small issuers are less known by municipal bond investors. Because
of information asymmetry, JPAs may have marketing advantages over small local
agencies that are less sophisticated and not as well known by investors. Since the
transparency within the municipal bond market is still relatively low, and information
cannot flow freely, sophisticated issuers benefit from the experience and professionalism
of JPAs, which results in lower borrowing costs.
Hypothesis 2: sophisticated issuers prefer arm’s length investors.
Third, CDIAC states that local agencies use JPAs in order to disperse fixed
issuance costs through bond pools. Fixed issuance costs do not increase proportionally
with a bond’s principal amount. Hence, they are a greater burden for small issues than
large issues. Small issues can benefit from economies of scale by engaging in bond
pooling through JPAs. For large issues, however, this benefit is outweighed by the
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diminished flexibility that borrowers have to coordinate with other borrowers within the
same pool and may not obtain the best results in terms of timing and structures.
Hypothesis 3: Bond issues of a small principal amount prefer conduit financing.
Hypothesis 4: Bond issues for some purposes are more likely to utilize conduit
financing.
Interest Costs
As mentioned above, most conduit bonds are issued for a single borrower,
although the legislation of JPA debt financing aims to lower costs through bond pooling.
As a matter of fact, conduit bonds may or may not obtain lower interest costs or issuance
costs. There are many reasons for this:
a). Risk dispersion
Normal municipal bonds issued by local agencies disperse the risk of default to a
number of different investors. Each investor holds only a small portion of the bond and
bears a small portion of default risk. However, if local agencies access credit market
through a conduit (etc., a JPA in California) either through a loan or purchased bonds, the
JPA bears all of the default risks. To be clear, a JPA is not required to pay off conduit
debts if a local agency decides to default. But the default harms the reputation of the JPA,
as the JPA is the conduit issuer. This will increase the borrowing cost of other bonds in
the future. As an intermediary, JPA may ask for a higher risk premium. Therefore, the
borrowing costs would be higher than normal municipal bonds.
b). Marketability
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JPAs have issued many bonds and built a relatively good reputation. Compared to
small local agencies, investors are more familiar with JPAs. It has been documented that
the reputation of issuers influences borrowing costs. Additionally, local agencies can
often only issue COPs, while local agencies can get the bond proceeds of Marks-Roos
bonds through a JPA. It is believed that investors accept Marks-Roos bonds more readily
than COPs. Therefore, conduit financing potentially decreases local agencies’ borrowing
costs because of marketability.
c). Complexity
Generally, the municipal bond market is considered highly illiquid. Compared to
other revenue bonds, conduit bonds are even more complex. One MRB may involve one
or several local agencies as conduit borrowers with different projects. Though the special
features of municipal bonds give borrowers more flexibility and attract certain investors
with similar demands, securities with simpler features and standard characteristics, such
as treasury bills, are typically more likely to find sellers and buyers and therefore, are
more liquid. If a security is not liquid and a seller finds it difficult to have bond buyer
demands, the seller has to sell the security at a discount or hold onto it. “Improved
liquidity is expected to increase securities values because rational investors discount
securities more heavily in the presence of higher trading costs, holding other things
equal”(Amihud, Mendelson, & Pedersen, 2012). Investors have the illiquidity expectation
of municipal bonds and are not willing to accept low yields even though the actual
default rate is very low. Conduit debt financing is usually more complex and involves

37

more information asymmetry. Investors may require higher yields than other municipal
bonds.
For these reasons, it is not obvious whether or not JPAs help local agencies to
reduce their borrowing costs. In the following section, I will use empirical analysis to
explore this question further.

Empirical Model
Data
The data used in this chapter comes from the California Debt and Investment
Advisory Commission (CDIAC), which covers all levels of debt issuers during the years
of 1984 to 2016, and was supplemented by the Revenue Bond Index produced by the
Bond Buyer. The fiscal information of local governments comes from the United States
Census Bureau, and is organized by Kawika Pierson, Mike Hand, and Fred Thompson
(Pierson, Hand, & Thompson, 2015).
Methodology
Debt financing Choices
Municipalities vary in terms of scale. They have distinct levels of population,
revenue, and expenditure. They also differ in their financial management capacity.
Literature on fiscal decentralization has revealed a concern about the capacity of local
level governments. Because of relatively lower salaries and fewer opportunities for career
advancement, it is harder for local governments to attract elites’ participation than it is for
higher-level governments. Although the democratic process implies that elected officials
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should follow the will of their jurisdiction, Prud'homme (1995) argues that this does not
always happen at the local level (Prud'homme 1995). Financial management capacity can
vary across states and different levels of government.
The quality of an issuer is a combination of its financial situation and financial
management capacity. Ideally, the quality of debtors should be measured by the fiscal
indexes of the local agencies. Unfortunately, this data is limited, and I would lose most
observations if I were to use the revenues of jurisdictions. In this study, two factors – “not
rated” and “issuer group” – are used as proxies of borrowers’ qualities.

Dummy

variables indicating “not rated” bonds and “issuer group” are incorporated into the model
to test their impact on debt financing choices.
In order to test the second hypothesis, I use two proxies for issuer sophistication.
First, following Roden and Bland (1986), issuer sophistication is measured by the number
of issues sold in the prior 10 years. Only the direct issues are considered, and bond issues
through JPAs are viewed as irrelevant. Second, if a local agency has a top 10 financial
advisor to provide professional opinions, then the local agency is considered a
sophisticated borrower.
To test the third and fourth hypotheses, bond issuance purpose and principal
amount are used to examine the impact of bond features on decision making. 30 year
Treasury bond rates are used as a riskless capital rate.
Interest Costs
Literature on municipal bonds’ concerns about interest costs is rich and extensive
(Liu and Denison, 2014; Simonsen, Robbins and Helgerson, 2001; Peng and Brucato,
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2003; Daniels and Vijayakumar, 2007). Most early studies focus on the role of the issue
feature of the bond and the characteristics of bond issuers in determining the interest
costs. Numerous studies indicate the effects of different bond characteristics, such as the
features of specific tax-exempt bonds, the characteristics of the issuers, the scope of the
market for the bonds, and the conditions under which the bonds are initially sold all vary
greatly across individual bond issues, on a bond’s yield (Cook 1982). In terms of sale
types, both competitive bidding and negotiated sale have their advantages and
disadvantages. In general, competitive bidding is expected to produce lower costs, and
negotiated sale is especially useful for those issuers that have not built their reputations.
Using data on municipal bond sales in Oregon from 1994 to 1997, Simonsen, Bill, Mark
D. Robbins, and Lee Helgerson found that competitive sales result in significantly lower
interest rates compared to negotiated sales.
The bond true interest rates (TIC) and issuance costs are modeled as a function of
Marks-Roos bond propensity score, market interest rate, and control variables. My
empirical model is as follows:
TIC or issuance cost = f (Market interest rate, Marks-Roos bond propensity score, w),
where
Market interest rate = market interest rate produced by the Bond Buyer (the Revenue
Bond Index)
Marks-Roos bond propensity score = A latent scale of the degree to which a county or
school district, etc., is likely to use a conduit bond.
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w is a vector of control variables. Following previous studies (Robbins and
Simonsen, 2012; Ely, 2013; Liu and Denison, 2014), control variables include
Competitive = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond is sold via competitive bid; 0 if not
Ln (principal) 8 = Natural logarithm of the principal amount of the bond/note
Ln (years to maturity) = Natural logarithm of the bond length
Refunding = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond is sold to refund another bond; 0 if not
Credit Ratings = Highest credit ratings provided by Moody’s, S&P or Fitch.
Enhancement = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond has any kind of credit enhancement; 0 if
not
Sale Year = Year that the bond was first issued
Bond Type = A series of dummy variables representing bond types by payment sources
Callable = Dummy variable; 1 if the bond is callable; 0 if not

Estimation
In order to examine what drives the decision between debt financing methods and
whether conduit financing reduces interest rates, this study uses a data set that covers
long-term bonds issued by all levels of local governments during the years of 1984 to
2016, including Cities, Counties, K-14 Schools, Mello-Roos, Special Districts, JPAs, and

8

Along with previous public finance literature, this study also use natural logarithm of the principal amount
and natural logarithm of the bond length. This transformation has good features: it does not change the
fluctuation direction of a variable, but the coefficients are easier to interpret.
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UC & CSU. This sample not only has the information of bond features but also contains
data on issuer characteristics, including the number of issues sold in the prior 10 years by
a government agency. If the agency has a top financial adviser, the Bond Buyer Revenue
Bond Index is used as a market benchmark of the interest rates; Treasury bill yield is used
to control the inflation factor; both of them are matched in the same week with the issue
date of the particular bond.
Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 below shows the summary statistics of continuous variables. Summary
statistics of the full sample, conduit bonds, and non-conduit bonds are reported separately.
Means of TIC, Bond Buyer Revenue Bond Index, and years to maturity are similar in the
three samples. Marks-Roos bonds have smaller average principal amounts than other
bonds in the sample. The prior issuance number of Marks-Roos bonds has a larger mean,
but also a larger standard deviation than other bonds.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
Full sample
Variable
TIC
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond
Index
Treasury bill yield
Principal amount (million)
Year to maturity
Prior issuance number
Natural log of principal
amount
Natural log of year to maturity

Obs
Mean
6,554 5.467

Std.
Dev.
1.573

Min
0.126

Max
14.000

6,560
6,560
6,560
5,574
6,560

1.013
1.574
74.700
8.526
30.613

4.290
2.490
0.006
1.000
0.000

10.250
11.920
1,970.000
44.000
367.000

6,560 16.058 1.653
5,574 2.999 0.530

8.693
0.000

21.399
3.784

Obs
Mean
6,177 5.470

Std.
Dev.
1.583

Min
0.126

Max
14.000

6,178
6,178
6,178
5,192
6,178

1.032
1.607
76.600
8.566
30.382

4.290
2.490
0.006
1.000
0.000

10.250
11.920
1,970.000
44.000
367.000

6,178 16.099 1.663
5,192 2.998 0.533

8.693
0.000

21.399
3.784

Min
0.905

Max
12.000

4.380
2.980
0.110
2.000
0.000

6.520
7.570
182.000
40.000
119.000

5.608
5.492
30.700
22.338
16.926

Non-MRB
Variable
TIC
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond
Index
Treasury bill yield
Principal amount (million)
Year to maturity
Prior issuance number
Natural log of principal
amount
Natural log of year to maturity

5.637
5.531
31.900
22.338
16.290

MRB
Variable
TIC
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond
Index
Treasury bill yield
Principal amount (million)
Year to maturity
Prior issuance number
Natural log of principal
amount
Natural log of year to maturity

Obs
377

Mean
5.418

Std.
Dev.
1.410

382
382
382
382
382

5.140
4.867
10.600
22.348
27.204

0.403
0.616
17.100
7.974
32.488

382
382

15.388 1.305
3.014 0.486
43

11.608 19.017
0.693 3.689

Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show bond issue purposes. In this sample, most MarksRoos bonds are issued for “multiple capital improvements” and “Redevelopment,” which
account for approximately 67.28%. Other bonds are concentrated in K-12 school
facilities and other purposes.
Table 3.2 Bond Issue Purposes
Non-MRB
K-12
School
Facility
2,269
36.73

Multiple Capital
Improvements,
Public Works
617
9.99

Redevelopment,
Multiple Purposes
523
8.47

F
RP
MRB
F
72
150
107
RP
18.85
39.27
28.01
Total
F
2,341
767
630
RP
35.69
11.69
9.60
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage

Other
2,769
44.82

Total
6,178
100

53
13.87

382
100

2,822
43.02

6,560
100

Figure 3.2 Bond Issue Purposes (Percentage)
Other

Redevelopment, Multiple Purposes
Multiple Capital Improvements, Public
Works
K-12 School Facility
0
Total

10
MRB

44

20
Non-MRB

30

40

50

Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3 present bond credit ratings. In this sample, 96.07% of
Marks-Roos bonds are not rated. Other bonds of “not rated” only account for 24%, and
49.95% of them have the highest ratings (AAA).
Table 3.3 Bond Credit Ratings
Non-MRB
AAA
3,086
49.95

AA
918
14.86

A
497
8.04

BBB
190
3.08

BB
4
0.06

F
RP
MRB
F
13
0
1
1
0
RP
3.40
0.00
0.26 0.26 0.00
Total
F
3,099 918
498
191
4
RP
47.24 13.99 7.59 2.91 0.06
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage

Not rated
1,483
24.00

Total
6,178
100

367
96.07

382
100

1,850
28.20

6,560
100

Figure 3.3 Bond Credit Ratings (Percentage)

Not rated
BB
BBB
A
AA
AAA
0

20

40
Total

60
MRB

Non-MRB

45

80

100
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Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4 shows bond issues divided by bond features and conduit
financing, where "General obligation bond" accounts for 36.26% in the non_MRB
sample, while 37.7% of Marks-Roos bonds in this sample are "Limited tax obligation
bond."
Table 3.4 Debt Types
Non-MRB
General
obligation
bond
2,240
36.26

Limited
tax
obligation
bond
415
6.72

MarksRoos
Authority
Loan
12
0.19

Special
assessment
bond
300
4.86

F
RP
MRB
F
64
144
83
36
RP
16.75
37.70
21.73
9.42
Total
F
2,304
559
95
336
RP
35.12
8.52
1.45
5.12
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage

Tax
allocation
bond
Other Total
553
2,658 6,178
8.95
43.02 100
35
9.16

20
5.24

588
8.96

2,678 6,560
40.82 100

Figure 3.4 Debt Types (Percentage)

Other

Tax allocation bond
Special assessment bond
Marks-Roos Authority Loan
Limited tax obligation bond
General obligation bond
0

10
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20
MRB

Non-MRB
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382
100

Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show other bond features and issuers characteristics. The
majority (52.69%) of non-MRB bought enhancement, while only 7.33% of Marks Roo
bond. In terms of the issuer groups, it involves a number of local governments, city
government’s account for 22.59% of bond issue.
Table 3.5 Other Bonds Statistics (Frequency and Percentage)
NonMRB
F
4,354
1,305

MRB
RP
76.94
23.06

F
235
143

NO
YES
Top
financial
Tota
advisor
l
5,659
100
378
NO
4,866
78.76
360
YES 1,312
21.24
22
Competitive Tota
sale
l
6,178
100
382
NO
2,923
47.31
354
YES 3,255
52.69
28
Tota
Enhancement l
6,178
100
382
NO
3,135
50.74
122
YES 3,043
49.26
260
Tota
Callable
l
6,178
100
382
NO
4,098
66.46
212
YES 2,068
33.54
169
Tota
Refunding
l
6,166
100
381
Note: F refers to frequency; RP refers to row percentage
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Total
RP
62.17
37.83

F
4,589
1,448

RP
76.01
23.99

100
94.24
5.76

6,037
5,226
1,334

100
79.66
20.34

100
92.67
7.33

6,560
3,277
3,283

100
49.95
50.05

100
31.94
68.06

6,560
3,257
3,303

100
49.65
50.35

100
55.64
44.36

6,560
4,310
2,237

100
65.83
34.17

100

6,547

100

Table 3.6 Summary of Issuer Groups
group(IssuerGroup)
Cities
Counties
JPA & Marks-Roos
K-14 Schools
Mello-Roos
Special Districts
State of California
UC & CSU
Total

Freq.
8,754
2,622
8,758
6,844
2,731
4,258
4,541
238
38,746

Percent
22.59
6.77
22.60
17.66
7.05
10.99
11.72
0.61
100

Cum.
22.59
29.36
51.96
69.63
76.68
87.67
99.39
100

Regression Results
Table 3.7 shows the results of the Probit regression 9 of the debt financing method
decision model. The models are significant, and most of the factors are significant, and
most of the coefficients are as expected. The results suggest that all else being held equal,
“not rated” bonds and small principal amount issues are more likely to use conduit
financing. The negative coefficient of the prior issuance number proves the hypothesis
that sophisticated issuers are less likely to use conduits. Counter to expectation, the
coefficient of top financial advisors is positive, which suggests that more sophisticated
issuers also prefer conduit financing. This could be explained by two reasons. First,
issuers with top financial advisors are more familiar with the municipal bonds market and
believe that conduit financing brings greater benefits for those conduit financing cases.
Second, the top financial advisors do not perfectly capture issuer sophistication.

9

Probit model is more preferred here than linear probability model because the aim to use this model is to
predict issuers’ financing decisions rather than coefficients of dependent variables.
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Table 3.7 Probit Regression of Debt Financing Method Decision Model
Probit regression

Number of obs = 22931
LR chi2(13) = 4273.57
Prob > chi2 = 0
Pseudo R2 = 0.3797

Log likelihood = -3490.9585

Standard
Coefficient Error

z

P>z

[95%
Interval]

1.389
0.907

0.051
0.072

27.26
12.67

<0.001
<0.001

1.289
0.767

1.489
1.047

0.946

0.055

17.11

<0.001

0.838

1.055

1.445
-0.236

0.062
0.012

23.36
-20.12

<0.001
<0.001

1.324
-0.259

1.566
-0.213

-0.032
0.228

0.012
0.041

-2.57
5.61

0.010
<0.001

-0.056
0.148

-0.008
0.308

-0.001

0.000

-2.16

0.030

-0.002

0.000

0.010
-0.698
0.334
-0.227
-0.177

0.066
0.088
0.054
0.073
0.546

0.16
-7.96
6.20
-3.10
-0.32

0.875
<0.001
<0.001
0.002
0.746

-0.120
-0.870
0.229
-0.371
-1.248

0.141
-0.526
0.440
-0.083
0.894

Constant
-1.462
0.214
-6.82
<0.001
*Note: issuer group "Cities" are omitted as the reference group.

-1.883

-1.042

MRB
Not rated
K-12 School Facility
Multiple Capital
Improvements,
Public Works
Redevelopment,
Multiple Purposes
Treasury bill yield
Natural log of
principal amount
Top financial advisor
Prior issuance
number
Issuer Group
Counties
K-14 Schools
Mello-Roos
Special Districts
UC & CSU

Confident

Table 3.8 shows the results of instrumental variables (2SLS) regression of interest
costs model. The IV strategy here is to predict a propensity score from a Probit, which is
then used as the IV for using a conduit bond. This is similar to using propensity scores in
other policy studies. The propensity score is the fitted value from the Probit, which is a
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latent scale of the degree to which a county or school district, etc., is likely to use a
conduit bond 10. In the dummy variable group of "rating," bonds with rating lower than
BBB are omitted as the reference group; in the dummy variable group of "Debt Type,"
other debt types except the four groups that are listed here are omitted as the reference
group, and Cities in the “Issuer Group” are omitted as the reference group to avoid the
“dummy trap.”
Most of the control variables are the same as expected. The coefficients of the
dummy variable “Marks-Roos bond indicator” are negative and significant. This suggests
that controlling for other factors, TICs of conduit bonds are less than other bonds in the
sample by an average of 3.665 percent. That is, conduit financing costs less in terms of
interest rates. This finding is different from the results of Robbins and Simonsen (2012),
where they report that “The bonds sold to issue debt through these JPAs carried, on
average and all else equal, interest costs 24 basis points higher and issuance costs 33
percent greater than what would be expected for the same issues sold directly by a local
government.” This article by Robbins and Simonsen (2012), however, does not consider
the endogenous nature of debt financing choice. That is, local agencies do not randomly
choose conduit financing or direct issuance, and they make these decisions based on their
specific background. Thus, my study addresses this problem through a two stages
analysis. Surprisingly, enhancement is not associated with lower TIC. Enhancement is,
of course, not random.

10

It is similar in concept to psychology latent scales such as intelligence or depression, or in politics the
strength of support for a candidate, which is expressed by voting one way or another. The propensity score
is estimated from the probit and then used as a standard IV in the regression for TIC.

50

Table 3.8 Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression of Interest Costs Model
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression

Number of obs =
Wald chi2(23) =
Prob > chi2 =
R-squared =
Root MSE =
Standard
[95%
Coefficient Error
z
P>z
Conf.
-3.665
1.025
-3.58 <0.001 -5.674

5,288
3095.64
0
0.1845
1.2202

TIC
Interval]
Marks-Roos bond indicator
-1.656
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond
Index
1.027
0.042
24.63 <0.001 0.945
1.109
Competitive sale
-0.368
0.046
-7.95 <0.001 -0.458 -0.277
Natural log of principal
amount
-0.049
0.014
-3.57 <0.001 -0.077 -0.022
Natural log of year to
maturity
0.784
0.038
20.85 <0.001 0.710
0.858
Refunding bond
-0.152
0.073
-2.07 0.039 -0.296 -0.008
callable
-0.027
0.040
-0.67 0.503 -0.105 0.051
enhancement
0.428
0.076
5.63 <0.001 0.279
0.578
Bond ratings
AAA
-2.887
0.615
-4.69 <0.001 -4.093 -1.682
AA
-2.724
0.614
-4.44 <0.001 -3.928 -1.520
A
-1.939
0.615
-3.15 0.002 -3.145 -0.733
BBB
-1.874
0.624
-3.00 0.003 -3.096 -0.651
Not rated
-1.533
0.637
-2.41 0.016 -2.782 -0.284
Debt Type
General obligation bond
0.431
0.136
3.17 0.002 0.165
0.698
Limited tax obligation bond -0.116
0.255
-0.46 0.649 -0.616 0.384
Marks-Roos Authority Loan 3.689
0.923
4.00 <0.001 1.881
5.497
Special assessment bond
0.527
0.120
4.40 <0.001 0.292
0.762
Tax allocation bond
0.690
0.100
6.93 <0.001 0.495
0.885
Issuer Group
Counties
-0.204
0.083
-2.46 0.014 -0.367 -0.042
K-14 Schools
-0.396
0.094
-4.20 <0.001 -0.581 -0.211
Mello-Roos
1.062
0.272
3.91 <0.001 0.530
1.595
Special Districts
-0.255
0.062
-4.11 <0.001 -0.376 -0.133
UC & CSU
0.663
0.411
1.61 0.107 -0.142 1.468
Constant
0.521
0.686
0.76
0.448
-0.825 1.866
*Note: in the dummy variable"rating"group, rating lower than BBB are omitted; other in
the dummy variable"Debt Type"group, other debt types except the four group that listed
here are omitted
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Besides TIC, I also investigate issuance costs in detail, that is, fees paid to
financial teams. Interestingly, when examine the effect of conduit financing on Issuance
cost, I found the opposite result. As shown in table 3.9, this model use “Issuance cost per
principal amount” as the dependent variable, and all independent variables identified in
TIC model, which is the common method used in other literature. The coefficient of the
dummy variable “Marks-Roos bond indicator” is positive and significant. It suggests that
controlling for other factors, conduit bonds pay more issuance fee by an average of 8.734
percent than other bonds in the sample. That is, conduit financing costs more in terms of
issuance costs per principal amount of bond issues. This finding is consistent with the
result in Robbins and Simonsen (2012) who find issuance cost of Marks-Roos bonds is
33 percent greater than expected fee for the same issues sold directly by a local
government, although the effect is much smaller.
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Table 3.9 Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Regression of Issuance Cost Per Principal
Amount
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression

Issue
Costs
Pct
of
Principal Amt
Marks-Roos bond indicator
Bond Buyer Revenue Bond
Index
Competitive sale
Natural log of principal
amount
Natural log of year to
maturity
Refunding bond
callable
enhancement
Bond ratings
AAA
AA
A
BBB
Not rated
Debt Type
General obligation bond
Limited tax obligation bond
Marks-Roos Authority Loan
Special assessment bond
Tax allocation bond
Issuer Group
Counties
K-14 Schools
Mello-Roos
Special Districts
UC & CSU
Constant
Instrumented:

Number of obs
Wald chi2(22)
Prob > chi2
R-squared
Root MSE

= 4,735
= 969.75
= 0
= 0.0099
= 3.9983
[95% Conf.
Interval]
1.923 15.545

Standard
Coefficient Error
z
8.734
3.475
2.51

P>z
0.012

-0.597
-0.984

0.124
0.158

-4.80
-6.21

<0.001 -0.841
<0.001 -1.295

-0.353
-0.674

-1.116

0.051

-22.07

<0.001 -1.215

-1.017

0.374
-1.031
0.214
1.226

0.134
0.221
0.139
0.266

2.80
-4.67
1.54
4.61

0.005
<0.001
0.124
<0.001

0.112
-1.464
-0.059
0.705

0.636
-0.598
0.487
1.747

-1.413
-0.105
-0.126
-0.597
-3.742

2.320
2.320
2.325
2.351
2.370

-0.61
-0.05
-0.05
-0.25
-1.58

0.543
0.964
0.957
0.799
0.114

-5.961
-4.651
-4.683
-5.206
-8.388

3.135
4.441
4.432
4.011
0.903

-1.343
-2.967
0.000
1.148
-0.815

0.423
0.870
(omitted)
0.403
0.332

-3.18
-3.41

0.001
0.001

-2.172
-4.672

-0.514
-1.262

2.85
-2.45

0.004
0.014

0.358
-1.466

1.938
-0.164

-0.287
0.115
3.096
-0.690
-0.247
24.703
MRB

0.287
0.300
0.985
0.255
1.429
2.570

-1.00
0.38
3.14
-2.70
-0.17
9.61

0.317
0.701
0.002
0.007
0.863
<0.001

-0.850
-0.473
1.165
-1.190
-3.048
19.665

0.275
0.704
5.026
-0.190
2.554
29.741
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*Note: in the dummy variable"rating"group, rating lower than BBB are omitted; other in
the dummy variable"Debt Type"group, other debt types except the four group that listed
here are omitted
Conclusions and Implications
In this research, I investigate two questions: what drives local agencies to use
conduits, and whether interest costs of conduit bonds are significantly reduced. MRBs in
California are used as an example.

As an alternative way to issue bonds, conduit

financing has been widely used by local governments and nonprofit companies and
brings benefits to the organizations involved, such as flexibility and the potential
reduction of borrowing costs due to economies of scale. Based analysis using data on
MRBs during the year 1984 to 2016, I find that controlling for other factors, conduit
bonds cost less by an average of 3.665 percent. Low-quality local agencies or small bond
issues can potentially achieve lower borrowing costs through conduit financing.
Borrowing cost, however, is not the only issue of local government borrowing. In spite of
the benefits, conduit financing also provides a channel for avoiding voter approval and
circulating debt limits. A large amount of MRBs are not rated, which means these bonds
are not investigated by rating agencies. Bond pooling can involve several local agencies
with different levels of fiscal conditions and distinct capital projects to finance. If keeping
the debt burden of a local government within the debt repayment capacity is a desirable
goal, conduit financing should definitely be appropriately and effectively regulated.

54

Chapter 4 Quasi-Municipal Bonds of Chinese Subnational Governments:
Borrowing, Pricing and Fixed-Assets Expenditures

Introduction
With the acceleration of urbanization, the need to finance urban infrastructure is
critical in many developing countries. Adequate financial resources supporting long-term
urban infrastructure are necessary for economic development and enable the cities to
better face the challenges of globalization (Attinasi & Brugnoli, 2001). Bond finance has
been widely used in the U.S. as a relatively low cost direct financing option and
increasingly is considered within developing countries. China has a long history of public
bond financing, which could be traced back to the Qing Dynasty in the 19th Century
based on maritime customs duties (Huang & Zhu, 2009). The growth of local government
debts appeared in recent years, and the regulation of local debt is not clear. In particular,
the RMB four-trillion economic stimulus plan requires subnational governments to
provide matching funds, which further increases subnational government debts. Growth
has especially occurred for contingent debt, i.e. debts through financial vehicles launched
by subnational governments, including the urban investment bond, which is also called
quasi-municipal bond 11 . These financial vehicles help governments to build public
infrastructure, provide various public services, and make contributions to social
development.

11

In the U.S.A., “municipal bond” refers to bonds issued by state and local governments and the interest on
qualified municipal bonds is exempt from federal and most states income taxes. “Quasi-municipal bond” is
a special category of Chinese bonds and is not tax-exempt. “Quasi-municipal bond” is used because these
bonds are issued to fund public projects for local governments, but not the tax-exempt status.
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As in other developing countries, governance in China is highly centralized,
especially in the period of the planned economy. The central government made the
investment decisions and mainly relied on “pay-as-you-go” financing, and the debt
magnitude was relatively small, but things began to change since the reform of the 1980s.
The Chinese central government gradually decentralized fiscal power. After Third
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978,
China began to carry out a comprehensive reform of the economic system. Adapt to
demand of the economic system transition, the government financial management system
has undergone major reforms and adjustments in 1980, 1985 and 1988. The 1994 fiscal
reform of the tax sharing system basically established norms of fiscal power and service
delivery responsibilities between the central and local governments. The following tax
reforms mainly aimed for the construction of public financial framework focusing on
expenditure management reforms. As a matter of fact, revenue share of GDP of the
subnational governments declined after the 1994 fiscal reform.
The 1994 Budget Law forbade the subnational governments to run deficits and
borrow from the direct bond market—they can borrow only from the central government
and banks which are also under tight restrictions. The 1995 Guarantee Law forbade the
subnational governments to provide guarantees for other entities’ borrowing transactions.
For example, the subnational governments are not allowed to legally guarantee stateowned companies’ borrowing. However, subnational governments’ demands gradually
drove the change of the financing system. In order to fill the financial gap and bypass the
legal restrictions, subnational governments have been heavily involved in contingent
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debts “which are placed off-budget” (Jun Ma & Liu, 2005b)--these debts are not reported
in the same way as other debts and Chinese budgeting and government accounting
system did not officially provide any information about magnitude of these contingent
debts. The central government was shocked by the rapid growth of the contingent debts.
The central government issued a series of policies to regulate the contingent debts, while
actively paving the way for subnational governments to access the bond market in
appropriate ways. In this way, the central government controlled what it viewed as
inappropriate financing while providing an acceptable alternative source of debt funding
for subnational governments.
Meanwhile, since the end of the 20th century, the central government launched a
series of financial reforms to set up the credit system in a way to benefit the economy. A
key reform transformed the credit system from a relationship basis to a market basis. The
relationship-based system, “…as embraced by many Asian countries in the mid-1990s, is
advantageous when policy goals are to shelter and develop young borrowers” (Martell,
2003a).

The market-based system, “…as embraced by the US and other western

countries, is advantageous when policymakers wish to design financing arrangements for
municipalities such that arrangements are commensurate with municipal expenditure
responsibilities and repayment capacities” (Martell, 2003a).
Previous research on municipal debt either focuses on bond market issues in the
U.S., or the theoretical debates on whether or not to allow the Chinese subnational
governments to issue bonds. There are limited empirical studies on the market status of
the Chinese bond market, and we are unaware of any study that examines the connections
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among borrowing and investment by subnational governments. This research aims to fill
this gap.
This work addresses two questions: (1) In Chinese quasi-municipal credit markets,
is there any evidence that the quasi-municipal bond market is partially influenced by
market principles; for example, do bond pricing choices reflect borrower risk? (2) How
are the borrowing price, the borrowing volume, and infrastructure expenditure
interconnected? Using data from 2007 to 2012, through a simultaneous equation model,
we find that the municipal credit system in China can be categorized as a mixture of
relationship-based and market-based characteristics; the fiscal resources available and
debt have a complementary relationship. Apparently, due to highly different credit
systems in the U.S. and China, it is reasonable to expect distinct credit system operations,
and the mechanisms that have been documented in the U.S. do not necessarily work well
in China. At the moment, the central government is arranging extensive use of municipal
bonds. Concerns about financial vehicles, including lack of transparency and weak risk
management of Chinese subnational governments, keep attracting and elevating attention
from both academic and practical perspectives.

Background
The past decade is called the “the golden decade of China” because of the fast
economic growth. According to the national bureau of statistics, the average annual
growth of GDP of China in 2002-2011 is 10.2%, and the government expenditure is
considered as a valuable contributor. However, China’s local governments’ debts
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expanded as well. Especially from 2008 to 2009, the debt balance of local government
rose sharply—growth rate is 61.92%. The RMB 4 trillion (US$ 586 billion) economic
stimulus plan includes RMB 2.8 trillion matching funds raised by local governments.
Since there was a large gap between the local governments’ revenues and the matching
funds, the central government encouraged local governments to broaden the financing
channels. The central bank and China Banking Regulatory Commission put forward some
solutions including conditional support of local governments to establish the funding
platforms, issue urban investment bonds, medium-term notes and using other financing
instruments 12.
As the municipal credit market expanded, many of the Chinese local
governments were burdened with heavy debt, and the new issues and concerns appeared,
such as high debt ratio and inadequate repayment abilities. Therefore, the central
government began a series of reforms to prevent the potential municipal debt crisis. Since
then, China’s local government funding platforms (LGFP) became a priority social and
economic issue. The subnational governments get access to the credit market through
LGFPs by way of bank loans or enterprise bonds--urban investment bonds. Since the
proceeds of these enterprise bonds are mainly used to finance the public projects or
services, these bonds are also called quasi-municipal bonds. Compared to bank loans,
quasi-municipal bonds have lots of advantages, such as a lower borrowing cost in a
mature market. However, a more important reason for the Chinese central government
actively promoting the municipal bond during recent years is that the bank has already
12

For more information, please see: the People’s Bank of China (central bank), China banking regulatory
commission (CBRC). ‘Guidance about further strengthen the credit structure adjustment to promote stable
and rapid economic development’ (Yin Jian Fa [2009] NO.92). March 2009.
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borne heavy risk as the loans of subnational governments rapidly increased. Systematic
financial risk might destroy the whole economy if large scale defaults happen, and
already there are some signals of trouble, such as the growth in the volume of nonperforming loans 13.
Current administrative divisions of China consist of four levels of subnational
governments: the province, prefecture, county, and township. The provincial level
includes autonomous region, province, municipality, and special administrative region.
The higher levels have authority over the lower, for example, the provincial level
governments have authority over other subnational administrative levels. The central
government has authority over all subnational governments. Since 1994, China
implemented revenue-sharing financial management system 14 . From the expenditure
perspective, the central government is in charge of national security, foreign affairs, and
the central state operating activities. In addition, the central government is responsible for
necessary expenditures that adjust the national economic structure, coordinate regional
development, and the implement macro-control. Subnational governments are mainly
responsible for the expenditures of the operation of subnational administrative
departments and the region's economic development, such as support for agriculture,
urban maintenance and construction funds, and local culture, education, health and other
operating expenses.

13

According to 2014 financial statements of banks, the volume of non-performing loans rose more than 30%
in several large banks than in 2013, For example, the non-performing loans of Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China increased by 33% over the previous year, and non-performing loan ratio was 1.13%, which
increased by 0.19%, rising for two consecutive years (For more information, please see
http://wallstreetcn.com/node/215779).
14
For more information about the government revenue and expenditure, please see the web site of Ministry
of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhuantilanmu/zhongguocaizhengtizhi/).
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The fiscal revenues are divided into three categories: the central tax, local tax and
shared tax. (1) The central tax is the revenue of the central government, which aims to
safeguard national interests and the implement macro-control policies for tariffs,
consumption taxes, income tax of national owned corporations. (2) Shared taxes are
shared by the central and subnational governments, which include taxes that are directly
related to economic development, including value-added tax, resource tax, and securities
transaction tax. (3) Local taxes consist of other taxes that are suitable for local collection,
for example, business tax, income tax of local business, real estate tax, and personal
income tax.
Subnational governments get transfer payments from the central government in
addition to the shared taxes and local taxes generated at the local level. There are two
kinds of transfer payments: the general transfer payment and the special transfer payment.
The general transfer payment is that the central government provides subsidies to
subnational governments to compensate for financial inequities (primarily in the Midwest
region). The special transfer payment refers to the subsidies that are earmarked for a
particular purpose and are mainly used for education, social security and agriculture.
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Figure 4.1 Revenue and Expenditure Proportion of the Central and Subnational
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China’s Local Government Funding Platforms (LGFPs)
The State Council defines the Local Government Funding Platforms (LGFPs) as
legal entities founded by local governments and its subsidiaries by means of financial
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appropriation or asset injection (such as land, equity, etc.), specializing in funding,
investing, constructing, and operating public or quasi-public projects commissioned by
local governments (Guo, 2010). LGFP usually includes lots of specific purpose
companies which are called urban investment companies such as Shanghai Urban
Construction Investment and Development Corporation. The bonds issued by these urban
investment companies are called urban investment bonds, which is viewed as quasimunicipal bonds. He and Man(He & Man, 2012) provide further explanations:
“These quasi-public agencies generally are incorporated as different investment
companies in order to finance and invest as a commercial entity. The state and local
governments backed these financing platforms by imputing hard assets, such as land,
state-owned properties, and even revenue from fees and taxes. In other words, the state
and local governments bear certain liabilities to pay for the debt if the financing
platforms fail to meet their engagements. So these debts are considered to be the “hidden
debt” of the SNGs although they are not included in the SNGs’ balance sheet.” 15
The actual controllers of the urban investment companies in the LGFPSs are the
subnational governments and their subsidiaries, and most of the projects operated by
them are nonprofit, although on the surface they often look like for-profit companies.
They have the status of independent legal entities. Most of them are limited liability
companies, including general trading companies such as construction investment
companies and state-owned property operation companies, and industry investment
companies such as water utility companies and transportation companies 16. LGFP are
usually supported by the subnational governments through financial appropriation or
asset injection. Financial appropriation involves the authorization of fiscal resources.

15

SNGs refer to local governments in this paper.
For more information, please see: Ministry of Finance, Development and Reform Commission, People's
Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission. Notice about the implementation of the State
Council on strengthening local government financing platform management related issues. FB [2010] No.
412, July 30, 2010.
16
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Asset injections are investments of nonfinancial assets such as land, stock rights or
charge rights.

Each urban investment company will utilize a mix of financial

appropriations and asset injection activities. The urban investment company provides
public or quasi-public goods, such as constructing the public infrastructures and
properties, supporting facilities, and public transportation 17.
One thing to emphasize here is that, despite of the status of independent legal
entities, the urban investment companies gain the potential credit enhancements
supported by the local governments; in other words, these entities integrate the
government credits and commercial credits. In the original phases, the local governments
usually inject assets to make the platforms bigger, and the local governments may also
provide guarantee documents if necessary. LGFPs are creations of Chinese subnational
governments and have different degrees of dependency on their parental governments.
Plenty of literature discusses the causes for the debt expanding of the local
governments and the emergence of LGFPs(Ba, 2009; China-Development-Review, 2010;
Feng, 2014; Jiang & Xu, 2014; Jun Ma & Liu, 2005b) , and many of them agree the
following points: since the reform of tax-sharing system in 1994, financing capacity of
local governments is significantly constrained; in the Budget Law of 1994, local
governments are prohibited from issuing local government bonds, except as otherwise
prescribed by laws or the State Council; as a result, LGFPs came into being to provide
finance for local infrastructure construction, and to boost economic growth. At the end of
2010, there were 6,576 LGFPs.

17

Ebit.
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Figure 4.2 Causes for Emergence of China’s Local Government Funding Platforms
(LGFP) 18

Incentives of Subnational Government Officials to Borrow
Governments are operated by public officials. Public administration theories
generally suppose the government officials are rational decision makers. Why do
subnational government officials choose debt finance? Based on Ma and Liu (2005) and
the “reverse soft budget constraints” theory(Zhou, 2005), behaviors of subnational
government officials can be explained from three perspectives: the institutional
environment, incentive mechanism, and constraints(Jun Ma & Liu, 2005a).
First, since the reform in 1978, China's ruling party began to establish the
legitimacy of the ruling on the basis of economic development, although it has changed
from the achievement view that emphasizing on economic growth alone to emphasizing
both economic and social development. In addition, subnational governments operate in a
fiscal decentralization system under an administrative centralization. After the reform of

18

SNG refers to the subnational government, and LGFP refers to Local Government Funding Platforms.
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tax-sharing system in 1994, lots of subnational governments had fiscal difficulties,
especially in central and western regions. On the one hand, the legitimacy of the ruling
requires performances; on the other hand, the available resources are limited. The
institutional environment produces factors that induce the subnational governments break
the budget constraints. Second, subnational governments consist of officers that pay
attention to their professional and personal interests. Their salaries and other benefits are
directly related to job position. The existing cadre promotion system is a typical
"eliminated” system-- officials gradually promoted from the bottom to the top, and once
an officer does not get promoted in a certain level, he loses the promotion opportunities
to the higher level. This incentive mechanism induces local government officers
concerning short-term achievement, and passing the achievement signals to the higher
level governments through large-scale and resource-intensive investments and projects,
such as roads and bridges, which is also effective and easily measured signals. Third, the
institutional, social and creditor constraints are very weak(Jun Ma & Liu, 2005a).

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Previous scholars categorized credit systems into two forms: relationship-based
and market-based systems (Diamond, 1991; Peterson & Hammam, 1997; Rajan &
Zingales, 1998). Financial intermediation, including relationship banks 19 and credit rating
agencies, “emerges as a natural institutional arrangement in an asymmetric information
economy” (Martell, 2003a).

19

In China, the banks are still largest investors in the enterprise bonds.
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Transactions could be made through relationship or market contracts. Based on
transaction cost theory, relationship contracting is preferred when lack of information
producing financial intermediation (credit rating agencies) and information verification is
difficult; otherwise, market contracting has greater merit (Williamson, 1979a). In the
relationship-based system, price may not closely associated with default risk, and
“quantity adjustments have much better incentive-compatibility properties than do price
adjustments” (Williamson, 1979b).
In a relationship-based system, the financier (relationship bank) usually has
monopoly power on the market. The entrance barriers come from regulation or a low
degree of transparency (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). In this case, the transaction is made
through negotiations, and borrowing cost depends on bargaining power. Therefore,
institutional relationships are very important, and a good relationship may lead to
discounted borrowing prices or larger borrowing volume. The relationship-based system
is particularly useful when the market is immature or the borrower lacks a good
reputation (Diamond, 1991; Peterson & Hammam, 1997).
In a market-based system, institutional relationship is not as important, since the
transaction decision is determined by market competition, and the interest rate should
reflect default risk. Credit rating agencies provide information to deal with information
asymmetry problems. Various financiers make their investment decisions based on bonds
ratings and other published information, and their investment returns are protected by
contracts (Martell, 2003b).
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Given the characteristics of two forms of credit systems, what should we expect?
In the context of China, who is borrowing, how much do they pay, and does
infrastructure demand drive the bond issuance? Further, based on the above evidence,
after several decades of market reform, should this bond market be characterized as a
market-based credit system? Focusing on these questions, this study examines the
following hypotheses.
H1: under a market-based credit system, borrowing cost is positively associated
with default risk.
H2: in a market-based credit system, subnational governments with higher
repayment capacity and higher financing demands will issue more bonds.
H3: annual fixed asset expenditures of a subnational government should be
positively related to infrastructure demands and available resources, and negatively
related to debt financing costs. 20
H4: in a relationship-based municipal credit system, risk will not be completely
expressed by prices. Therefore, some or all of the above hypotheses might fail.

Methodology
A municipal bond market with highly marketization degree should allocate the
resources efficiently. High risk bonds will bear relatively high borrowing costs, and vice
versa. We are particularly interested in how urban investment bonds are priced, which

20

Debt financing should include bonds and bank loans. However, because of data limitation, this paper only
focuses on bond issuances.
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partially captures the image of subnational governments’ debt financing. To our
knowledge, limited research examines the question of what drives pricing of Chinese
urban investment bonds and no empirical research exists addressing the relationships
between the pricing, borrowing and fixed asset expenditures. Yihe Qian and Xuejun Jin
use data of medium-term notes excluding urban investment bonds find that the inter-bank
bond market already has a reasonable risk pricing capability(Qian & Jin, 2013). Qi et al
(2012) using data of several kinds of urban investment bonds in 2009, found that the
credit spread of the Chinese urban investment bonds significantly associated with asset
sizes of issuing corporations, the per capita GDP of the regions that the corporation
located, interest rates of reference corporation bonds, and guarantee utilization(Qi, Ge, &
Meng, 2012). Ma and Yang (2013) found that the type of financial backing on urban
investment bonds has a significant impact on the credit spread(Jinhua Ma & Yang, 2013).
In the following section, a more comprehensive model is developed to estimate the risk
premium of an urban investment bond and test the relationships. All equations and
variables are described.
Simultaneous equations models require identification assumptions. In this model,
the risk premium, annual new issuance of bonds, and fixed assets expenditure are
simultaneously determined.
The assumptions here are summarized as follows (endogenous variables are in
italics). (1) The revenue ratio, bond rating, GDP, maturity, par value and previous bond
issuances affect risk premium. (2) The risk premium, GDP, margin, urban, and previous
bond issuances affect both the annual new issuance and fixed-Assets expenditures. (3)
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Annual new issuance and fixed-Assets expenditures affect each other because money is
required to build assets, while the availability of borrowing increases the size of
infrastructure projects.
Determinants of Risk Premium (Equation 1)
The risk premium is the difference between coupon rate of an urban investment
bond and risk-free lending rate 21 . The risk premium is viewed as determined by the
issuer’s fiscal capacity, the feature of a bond, and macroeconomic conditions (Cook,
1982; Dwight V. Denison, Yan, & Zhao, 2007; Liu & Thakor, 1984; Simonsen, Robbins,
& Helgerson, 2001). Studies have found that issuers with better fiscal capacities tend to
get lower risk premium. In this study, the ratio of annual revenue to expenditure
(Revratio) 22 is used to capture the fiscal capacity of each province or direct-controlled
municipality.
We consider some futures of a particular bond issue related to default risk that
have been documented in previous literature (D. V. Denison, 2001; Dwight V. Denison,
2012; Hsueh & Kidwell, 1988; Qi et al., 2012; Qian & Jin, 2013). Higher bond credit
ratings imply higher credit quality and lower default risk. Accordingly, the bond market
requires higher risk premium for the lower rating bonds. Longer maturity is generally
associated with higher risk because “a bond with longer maturity is less liquid and is
vulnerable to interest rate risk. Municipal bonds may be less susceptible to changes in the
business cycle than corporate bonds, but the risk of municipal revenue bonds backed by
21

This study uses the interest rate of the Treasury bill in the year that the urban investment bond was issued
as the risk-free lending rate.
22
The expenditure includes both current and capital expenditure of each province or direct-controlled
municipality.
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elastic revenues such as the sales and income taxes will oscillate with the business
cycle"( D. V. Denison, 2001).
Determinants of Annual New Issuance (Equation 2)
In a market-based credit system, the annual debt issuance (D) should depend on
the repayment capacity and debt financing demands. The operation margin (Margin) and
economic condition (GDP) are used to capture repayment capacity of the subnational
governments. Borrowing price and previous bond issuance represent debt management.
Issuers that face higher risk premiums are expected issue less bonds. Furthermore, local
annual fixed asset expenditures and urbanization represent the demands for capital and
should drive debt issuance into higher volume.
Determinants of Annual Fixed Asset Expenditures (Equation 3)
Annual Fixed Asset Expenditures (I) depends on infrastructure demands,
available funding, borrowing costs, and previous fixed asset expenditures. General
operating expenditure is considered as the lowest expenditure requirements to operate a
government agency; operating margin is calculated by ratio of the difference between
revenue and general operation expenditure over revenue. The higher the general
operating expenditure, the lower the resources left for fixed asset expenditures.
Urbanization reflects infrastructure demand, and should be positively associated with
fixed asset expenditure. GDP, annual new bond issuance, and previous debt reflect the
available resources, which should be positively correlated with fixed asset expenditures.
Borrowing price should reduce borrowing. Investment is highly auto-correlated,

71

presumably because investment takes time. Bond rating is in categories, which works as
well as rating being a scale (note the monotonicity).
More specifically, the mathematical model is represented by the following
simultaneous equations. Risk premium (R), annual new issuance (D), and annual fixed
asset expenditures (I) are endogenous variables; other variables are exogenous. Note that
financial data are in units of RMB 100,000,000 and that in the last ten years, the yuandollar exchange rate has been between 6.0 and 8.0 Yuan per dollar since 2005. This
model is identified by Urban not being in R, and bond ratings not in the second & third
equations, and lagged investment only in investment itself, where the coefficient is not
significantly different from 1.0.
R=fn (-Revratio, -bondAAA, -bondAA+, +bondAA-, +bondA+, -GDP, +Maturity,
+Parvalue, +Debtprev) + ɛ 23

(1)

D=fn (+I, +Margin, -R, +GDP, +Urban, -Debtprev) + ɛ

(2)

I=fn (+lagged I, +Urban, +GDP, +D, -R, +Debtprev, +Margin) + ɛ

(3)

Data Analysis and Empirical Findings
Data used in this study is collected from two main sources. First is the Wind
database, which is a comprehensive financial database including detailed information for
bonds and stocks. Since there are only a few bond issuances before 2007, and including
lots of missing data, this study uses the data from January 2007 to December 2012. The
Wind database provides information about the coupon rate, the issuer, the maturity, the
23

Bonds with credit rating AA are used as the reference group, and hence omitted in the formula.
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credit rating, and the par value. The interest rates of treasury bills also come from the
Wind database, and then the risk premium is calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate.
The average bond yield of the one-year treasury bill is viewed as the risk-free security, in
particular the average bond yields of the one-year treasury bill at the year the bond was
issued, to capture the market condition at that time.
The repayment ability is believed to be a very important factor and directly
influences the bond yields if the market is efficient, but how to measure the repayment
ability is a difficult question. One method is to examine the financial condition of each
direct issuer of enterprise bonds, but since most urban investment enterprises are unlisted,
it is difficult to collect their financial statements. Available financial reports show that
few of them earn enough income from their own operation to pay off bonds—a large
portion of them pay debts by subsidy or transformed funding from the parent subnational
governments(Qi et al., 2012). Therefore this study measures repayment capacity by fiscal
conditions of these subnational governments. Government fiscal information comes from
the China National Bureau of Statistics. There are 1314 observations, including most of
the bonds issued through the financial vehicles. Among 31 provinces and directcontrolled municipalities, 30 of them issued urban investment bonds, although the debt
levels are quite different.
The model is estimated by three-stage least-squares regression, but we also
considered two-stage least-squares estimation and the overall conclusions remain
unchanged. Table 4.1 shows the results of the simultaneous equations. All of the three
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equations are statistically significant at p<0.001. The r2 is 0.2639, 0.8321, and 0.9748
respectively.
The results suggest that there is some evidence for market-based borrowing. The
findings are discussed in context of the hypotheses previously discussed. The interest
rate is positively associated with default risk which is consistent with a market-based
system [Hypothesis #1]. Risk premium is negatively correlated with annual new issuance
(coefficient is -34.34), suggesting that borrowing price significantly affects how much
they are borrowing. Bond credit ratings significantly affect the risk premium—the higher
the credit ratings, the less the issuer paid. Both maturity and previous debt are
significantly and positively correlated with risk premium, indicating that the market price
reflects default risks. However, par value is negatively and significantly associated with
risk premium. The market-based theory states that larger par-values imply greater default
risk and therefore associated with higher risk premium. The positive coefficient of par
value may suggest the existence of quantity discount or economies to scale and is
consistent with the transaction cost theory observed by Martell (Martell, 2003a)
Hypothesis two posits that subnational governments with higher repayment
capacity and higher financing demands issue more bonds. Subnational governments with
healthier fiscal conditions measured by credit ratings and higher GDP have lower risk
premiums on average. Lower risk premiums are associated with more annual debt
issuance. Higher risk premiums are associated with lesser amounts of annual new bond
issuance.
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Hypothesis three posits that the annual fixed asset expenditures of a subnational
government are positively related to infrastructure demands and available resources, and
negatively related to debt financing costs. The borrowing price, the annual bond issuance,
and the fixed asset expenditure by the subnational governments are interconnected; more
fixed asset expenditure leads to more annual bond issuance; and the lower the borrowing
price, the larger the amount of bonds issued. Fixed asset expenditure and bond issuance
are significantly explained by each other, which suggests that the urban investment bonds
contribute to public fixed asset expenditure, and meanwhile bond issuance is driven by
demand for infrastructure financing, which supports the market-based hypothesis.
Hypothesis four states that risk will not be completely reflected by prices in a
relationship-based municipal credit system. Economic condition and the operating margin
are negatively and significantly associated with annual bond issuance. This finding is
counter to the market-based hypothesis but is consistent with the pecking-order theory
where organizations prefer to use their earnings to finance business activities and thus use
less debt capital. Previous bond issuance is highly correlated with annual new issuance,
which is also counter to market-based system expects. Due to risk management concerns,
the regulatory authority tightened the debt financing rules since 2009, but also promoted
the smooth completion of old projects of LGFP. The subnational governments that issued
more bonds previously tend to issuance more. One explanation could be follow-up
funding requirement of LGFP projects and those regions burdened with debts are most in
need. Another explanation could be familiarity of bond financing and good reputation
establishment.
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Fixed asset expenditures exhibits mixed evidences of market-based system.
Positive coefficients of GDP, Margin and annual debt issuance suggest that regions with
more available resources tend to spend more on investment in fixed assets. However,
counter to market-based theory, the fixed asset expenditure is positively associated with
borrowing prices and negatively related to urbanization. Fixed asset expenditure is highly
auto-correlated, presumably because investment takes time.
In summary, the empirical results indicate mixed evidence. Even after several
financial reforms, the Chinese credit system cannot be categorized fully as a marketbased system. The relationship-based characteristics still exist. Deeper market reforms
may decrease concerns for funding allocation and efficiency.
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Table 4.10 24Results of Three-stage Least Squares Estimation

Risk Premium (R) (%)
Revenue ratio(%)
Bond AAA
Bond AA+
Bond AABond A+
GDP(trillion)
Maturity(year)
Par value(100 million)
Debt previous(100 million)
Constant

-0.905***
-1.215***
-0.236***
0.548***
1.193*
0.0125
0.0470**
-0.0167***
0.000271***
4.728***

(-5.56)
(-15.02)
(-5.36)
(3.60)
(2.39)
(0.46)
(3.06)
(-4.32)
(3.50)
(35.48)

Annual Bond New Issuance (D)
(100 million)
Risk premium (%)
Fixed asset expenditures(100 million)
GDP(trillion)
Margin (%)
Urban (%)
Debt previous(100 million)
Constant

-34.34**
0.0147***
-0.00324***
-476.3***
0.306
0.793***
467.8***

(-3.13)
(8.13)
(-3.79)
(-4.75)
(0.44)
(45.67)
(5.86)

Fixed Asset Expenditures (I)
(100 million)
Lagged fixed asset expenditures(100 million) 0.996***
(69.04)
Annual bond new issuance(100 million)
3.578***
(6.27)
***
Risk premium (%)
243.8
(3.96)
GDP(trillion)
0.0596***
(12.77)
***
Margin (%)
2183.6
(3.39)
Urban (%)
-22.11***
(-5.71)
Debt previous(100 million)
-2.387***
(-5.15)
*
Constant
-1077.5
(-2.07)
t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: sample size = 1314, and all equations are statistically significant at p<0.0001. The
r2 is 0.2639, 0.8321, and 0.9748for R, D, I, but the r2 is not maximized in this estimation.

24

Most of financial data are in units of 100 million Yuan except GDP, and that in the last ten years, the
yuan-dollar exchange rate has been between 6.0 and 8.0 Yuan per dollar since 2005.
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Conclusion and Discussion
In the U.S., a relatively mature market-based credit system has been formed for
state and local governments. The story is different in China. The high GDP growth was
maintained in China over the last 10 years, even during the financial crisis. However,
subnational government debt is increasing rapidly. Although the previous budgetary law
forbade subnational governments from directly issuing municipal bonds, many of them
are burdened with heavy debts, primarily issued through financial vehicles. These
financial vehicles help governments to build public infrastructure and provide various
public services. However, as subnational debt increases, concerns about the Chinese
credit system and the whole economy become more serious. This paper examines the
market characteristics of the credit system, and empirical results indicate that the quasimunicipal credit system in China can be characterized as a mixture of relationship-based
and market-based characteristics. The fiscal resources available and debt have a
complementary relationship.
Possible policy implications may be drawn from our analysis. Since the credit
system is still highly relationship based, the central government should promote the legal
financing mechanism based on bond financing to enhance transparency so that debt
management of subnational governments could be under public scrutiny and increase
incentives to improve debt management.
Due to the data limitations, this work does not include measurements of bank
loans, intergovernmental transfers, and administrative management ability. In order to
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capture a more comprehensive picture of funding allocation, further studies should
consider these perspectives.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Policy Implications

Introduction
As a finance instrument, municipal bonds played a pivotal role on financing
public works, make more resources available for states and locals to build their
infrastructures and capital projects,

and potentially stimulating the economy of the

society. Municipal bonds typically come in two forms: the general obligation bond (GO
bond) and the revenue bond, which is secured by the full faith and credit of the issuer, or
backed by a specific source of revenue. Along with the development of public
administration strategy and financial technology, municipal bonds have become abundant
and diverse that appeared various categories and providing different financing methods.
Among them, the conduit debt financing, which allows one entity to issue debts on behalf
of one or multiple governments, has been used by local governments as an alternative
financing vehicle. Although local governments need not borrow from conduits--they can
approach investors directly by issuing municipal bonds, conduit financing is compelling
to some local agencies that they believe it provides extra benefits.
In the state of California in the U.S., a local agency is allowed to borrow through
a joint powers agency (JPA); in China, various Chinese local government issued debts
through the local government financial vehicles (LGFV). Both JPA and LGFV serve as
conduits. Conduit financing is preferred by local agencies in certain circumstances
because it is more convenient or fixed issuance costs can be split between several conduit
borrowers through bond pooling. Conduit financing is intended to provide flexibility to
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local governments at reduced borrowing costs. However, conduit financing has been
accused of circumventing state regulations imposed in the local governments for a long
time, and the previous studies find no significant borrowing costs saving compared the
conduit bonds to similar revenue bonds. Why does conduit financing still have great
vitality? In this dissertation I examine debts of local governments issued through conduits
in the context of the U.S. and China, particularly paying attention to Marks-Roos bonds
and Chinese urban investment bonds.
Chapter 2 provides a background context and foundation for the whole
dissertation.

The chapter reviews the background context and provides analysis of

motivation for using conduits and key characteristics. MRBs and UIBs are compared to
identify the similarity and distinctive perspectives of the two mechanisms. It is intended
to provide an objective picture of how conduit financing has been used and to facilitate
deliberations over costs and benefits of using conduit financing. Then there are two
chapters that empirically examine two examples of the conduit bonds market and interest
costs of local governments. Chapter 3 investigates the Marks-Roos bonds in California,
and chapter 4 investigates Chinese urban investment bonds. Based on data from
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), chapter 3 of my
dissertation addresses two issues: (1) what drives local agencies to use conduit? (2) Did
conduit financing produce lower true interest costs than other revenue bonds? During the
borrowing process, the JPA efficiently reorganizes small issues as a financial
intermediary. Sophisticated local agencies with strong backgrounds prefer to issue
municipal bonds directly. A two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression are used to avoid
selection bias and potential endogeneity problems. The econometric model and results
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suggest that ceteris paribus, TIC of California local governments are significantly
reduced through conduit financing compared to in the absence of this choice. Chapter 4
focuses on Chinese local government debts issued through the local government financial
vehicles (LGFV). Specifically, this chapter addresses two questions: (1) in Chinese quasimunicipal credit markets, is there any evidence that the quasi-municipal bond market is
influenced by market principles? (2) How are borrowing price, borrowing volume, and
infrastructure expenditure interconnected? Using data from 2007 to 2012, through a
simultaneous equation model, I found that the municipal credit system in China has the
mixed characteristics of relationship-based and market-based systems; and that the
available fiscal resources and debt have a complementary relationship.

Contributions to the Literature
To my knowledge, there are very few studies that consider the drivers of local
governments’ debt financing choices and empirically examine the impact of conduit
financing on their borrowing costs. This dissertation contributes to three streams of
literature. The first is the literature on municipal finance concerned about local
governments. Although research on state government debt is vast, local government debt
financing receives less attention. A number of local governments bear heavy service
obligations but have limited revenue resources. Debt financing is of importance to those
municipalities without sufficient revenues to support the demand of public expenditures.
This dissertation contributes to this stream of literature in that it presents the evidence on
borrowing costs savings through conduit financing compared to the instances where
conduit financing is not used.
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The second stream of literature is that of conduit financing. The majority of
literature on conduit financing is concerned with taxing multijurisdictional corporations
or arbitrage in the financial market, and tax-exempt bonds used for private activities. This
dissertation shows that some municipalities prefer to use conduit financing, and it can
have a positive effect in the case of fair use.
The third stream of literature that this dissertation contributes to is that of research
methods. Prior research has used OLS regressions to investigate TIC of Marks-Roos
bonds and Chinese urban investment bonds, which ignore potential selection bias and
endogeneity problems. When addressing these econometrics problems with 2SLS or
simultaneous equation models, the resulting estimations present new evidence that differs
significantly from previous studies.

Future Research
While this dissertation has enriched the literature with several analyses, it also
presents abundant opportunities for future research. One potential direction is to expand
the scope of this study to predict municipalities’ financing choices. Debt issuing is a
complex process and requires lots of resource and time. Government officials make
financing decisions by integrating their fiscal, political and social constraints. Thus, other
factors, such as transaction costs, debt limits, and political environments might be also
important. In addition, clearer identifications for debtors’ qualities and issuer
sophistication should be explored. Or, instead of investigating borrowing costs, it could
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be productive to examine the effect of conduit financing on infrastructure construction,
property values, and economic development.

Policy Implications
Conduit financing provides an alternative way for local governments to finance
public works. The conduit works as a financial intermediary between conduit borrowers
and investors by producing information, providing loose certification and potential
enhancement, and thereby potentially reducing costs. This section discusses policy
implications from several perspectives.
First of all, MRBs require local agencies to prove that the issuances of debts will
lead to significant public benefits, which can range from “demonstrable savings in
effective interest rate” and “bond preparation, bond underwriting, or bond issuance costs,”
to “significant reductions in effective user charges levied by a local agency,”
“employment benefits from undertaking the project in a timely fashion,” and “more
efficient delivery of local agency services to residential and commercial development
(Lockyer, 2006).” These requirements force borrowers to examine public benefits prior to
issuing new debt, and debts that cannot meet this requirement will be denied. This
potentially increases the rationality and justifiability of carrying public debts.
Second, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that MRBs may produce lower interest
costs. This is important given that most local governments carry heavy debts and their
revenues are limited compared to their obligated expenditures. By saving funding from
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reduced interest costs, local governments may provide services in other aspects and
therefore taxpayers may also benefit from the conduit financing.
Third, JPAs typically have financing teams and are responsible for the structure of
financing, including documentation, and thus might reduce the search costs for local
agencies. If local agencies enter a bond pool, they might also get lower issuance costs due
to the economies of scale.
Fourth, research costs for investors could be significant, especially for the
individual investors. With the screening and monitoring of JPAs, the research costs of
investors might be reduced. Because of the repeated cooperation between JPAs and local
agencies, the research costs of JPAs might also be reduced, which improves the
efficiency of bond issuance processes.
Fifth, MRBs provide diversification for investors. The diversification of security
portfolios benefits investors through lower risks and higher yields. MRBs generally pay
higher interest rates than general obligation bonds with AAA credit ratings. A number of
MRBs are not rated. Due to the screening and certification of JPAs, MRBs could be an
investment option for those investors interested in high yield securities.
For a long time, as Chinese local governments’ investment and financing platform,
the urban investment companies have the shells of marketed enterprises along with the
essence of the government platform, and exercise finance functions of government
projects in the name of the enterprises, Under the background that local governments
were not allowed to issue municipal bonds before the implementation of the new budget
law in 2015, the urban investment companies are regarded as Chinese "municipal bonds"
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alternatives. Note that the market investors believe that the urban investment bonds are
significantly less risky than bonds of the ordinary enterprises as a result of local
governments pledging support.
Recognizing the default risk of urban investment bonds, the central government
adopted a series of measures to promote the standardization of local government bonds in
recent years. On the one hand, local governments are allowed to issue municipal bonds
within the debt limits; on the other hand, the Ministry of Finance explicitly promotes
market transformation of urban investment companies. Unlike earlier urban investment
debts, most of the new debts should not be identified as local government debts, but are
legally debts of urban investments companies, and safety should be questioned. However,
urban investment bonds with new low yields are still in high demand. An important
reason is that there is excess demand resulting from excessive of cash while limited
supply of quality credits, and investors have different views about the credits of urban
investment companies since the standards and methods of local governments to process
the debts are not uniform. During exploration of the model of cooperation between
government and enterprises in recent years, urban investment bonds will still play an
important role. Promoting marketization of urban investment debts, enhancing the
transparency of the market, and further improving professional of issuers and investors
will facilitate efficiency of the capital market and also protect investors.
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Appendix: Background of Chinese Urban Investment Bonds
The past decade is called the “the golden decade of China” because of the fast
economic growth. According to the national bureau of statistics, the average annual
growth of GDP of China in 2002-2011 is 10.2%, and the government investment is
considered as a valuable contributor. Although the growth rates of lots of countries were
very low in 2008 and 2009, under China's 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan launched by the
central government in 2008, China’s GDP growth still maintained 9.6% and 9.1%
respectively, indicating the power of the government investment. It’s generally believed
that the government investment contributed to China’s rapid economic development over
the past decade. The local governments’ investments have played a very important role in
China’s local economic development. 25
However, China’s municipal credit market expanded as well. Especially from
2008 to 2009, the debt balance of local government rose sharply—growth rate is
61.92%. 26 The 4 trillion yuan economic stimulus plan includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local
governments’ revenues and the matching funds, the central government encouraged local
governments to broaden the financing channels which included issuing more bonds.
The municipal bond market has developed substantially in the U.S. since the
1800s. The municipal bonds are issued by state and local governments to “finance
infrastructure and capital projects (Dwight, 2012).” Unlike in China, the growth of the

25

In this paper, China’s local governments refer to all levels’ government agencies except the central
government.
26
National Audit Office of China, 2011 No. 35: the national local government debt audit results
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municipal bond market in the U.S. is relatively stable. Except slight fluctuations in
certain years, in general, the U.S municipal debt outstanding is in a state of slow growth.
The municipal bond market in the U.S. is much more mature and the regulation and
management mechanism is more comprehensive.
Although old China's stock market has a long history, after the founding of
People's Republic of China, the government agencies in all levels rarely issued bonds and
the entire security market was closed from 1952-1981. The first stock market is the
Treasure bond market. In 1981, the central government began to issue treasury bills,
which marked the development of China's securities market entering a new historical
stage. However, the Budget Law prohibited local governments to issue bonds directly on
concerns of repayment abilities of local governments. 27 Two approaches to borrowing
from credit market have been developed in order to address temporary financial capital
shortages of local governments: “Proxy Treasure Bond” and “city investment bonds” (He
and Man, 2012). The city investment bonds are also called quasi-municipal bonds.

Proxy Treasure Bond
The process of debt financing for local government has evolved over the past
decades. In 1998, the Asian Financial Crisis was raging and the storm swept many
countries in Asia. The State Council decided to issue treasury bonds by the Ministry and
lend money to local governments for local economic and social development projects.
“The issue process of such bond is exactly the same as the Treasure Bond and the
27

According to the 28th paragraph of the Law of Budgeting, the local governments should not issue
municipal bond, except as otherwise provided in the law and the state council (China’s debt). Although the
new budget law implemented in 2015 has relaxed the restrictions.
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distribution of the revenue raised by such bond depended on the negotiations among the
central government with each provincial government (He and Man, 2012).”
Another issuing peak appeared during the Global Financial Crisis. In 2009 the
State Council agreed that the Ministry of Finance issued 200 billion yuan local bonds on
behalf of local governments and must be disclosed in the provincial budget, which can be
viewed as a facility move of local governments’ issuing municipal bonds. The Ministry
of Finance issued bonds on behalf of local governments and they paid the debt through
the Ministry of Finance as well. These bonds are named “2009 XX Province/autonomous
regions/municipalities/separately listed cities government bonds (XX period).”
The pilot program could be viewed as a big progress. Since 2011, Shanghai,
Guangdong and four other provinces were approved by the State Council to carry out
their own bonds as pilots, and the pilots expanded to six provinces in 2013. Currently,
only four provinces published information of local self-bonds in this year and the total
amount have reached 50 billion yuan, showing a breakthrough in both the bond sizes and
issuing form. The local self-bond is the transition from bonds that the central government
issues as a proxy and the actual municipal bonds that are completely issued by the local
governments. The "pilot approach of local self-bond in 2013" announced by the Ministry
of Finance further clarified in underwriting and bidding. 28

28

Full content could be seen here: (June 25,2013)
http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201307/t20130704_948951.html
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Urban Investment Bonds and LGFP
The 4 trillion yuan economic stimulus plan includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local
governments’ revenues and the matching funds, the central bank and China Banking
Regulatory Commission put forward some solutions including conditional support of
local governments to establish the funding platforms, issue enterprise bonds, mediumterm notes and using other financing instruments to broaden the financing channels 29.
This kind of bond is called a “quasi-municipal bond.” As the municipal credit market
expanded, many of the Chinese local governments were burdened with heavy debt, and
the new issues and concerns appeared, such as high debt ratio and inadequate repayment
abilities. Therefore, the central government began a series of reforms to prevent the
potential municipal debt crisis. Since then, China’s local government funding platforms
became a priority social and economic issue. At present, the regulatory supervision of
quasi-municipal bonds in China is still in alignment with enterprise bonds, which is
accused as ignoring the objective needs of the development of the municipal debt, and
will bring potential economic risks to both the central and the local governments.
The development of LGFPs went through the following several phases 30:
1980-1994 First phase of exploration

29

The People’s Bank of China (central bank), China banking regulatory commission (CBRC). ‘Guidance
about further strengthen the credit structure adjustment to promote stable and rapid economic development’
(Yin Jian Fa [2009] NO.92). March 2009.
30
For more information, please see: Shanghai Institute research group of state-owned capital operation.
Shanghai local government investment and financing platform for investment and financing mechanism’s
innovation research [J]. Shanghai Administration Institute, May 2012 Volume 13, No. 3, P59-70.
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In the 1980s, Guangdong province for the first time tried to construct roads by a
loan and pay the principal and interest by the road toll. In 1988, the State Council of
China proclaimed the reform plan of the investment management system: transform from
appropriation to loan to construct the basic infrastructures. Six professional investment
companies are established by the central government: energy, transportation, agriculture,
raw material, forestry, and textiles, which is the original form of LGFPs (Zhao, 2011).
1994-1997 early exploration
Since the reform of tax-sharing system in 1994, financing capacity of local
governments is significantly constrained. In order to meet the needs of local area and
solve the funding problems, lots of the authorities were established to plan and manage
the municipal construction to promote the economic development.
1997-2008 development in an all-around way
Facing the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the Chinese central government and
local governments launched lots of mass infrastructure construction to stimulate
economic development. Since 1998, China Development Bank advocated funding
platforms, and issued loans for infrastructure construction projects. From then, LGFPs
opened up a new phase(Zhao, 2011).
While LGFPs help to boost economic development, LGFPs were also
responsible for substantial increases in local debt levels. In 2006, NDRC (National
Development and Reform Committee) and four other committees issued a notice calling
for financial institutions to stop giving loans and credits to governments and local
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governments to stop providing guarantee or implicit guarantee, which play an important
role on constraining the scale of local governments’ debt. 31
2008-2010 explosions
In order to deal with the financial crisis of 2007, China's central government
launched 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan in 2008, which includes 2.8 trillion yuan matching
funds raised by local governments. Since there was a large gap between the local
governments’ revenues and the matching funds, the central bank and China Banking
Regulatory Commission put forward some solutions including conditionally support local
governments to establish the funding platforms, issue corporate bonds, medium-term
notes and using other financing instruments to broaden the financing channels. Under the
policy, plenty of funding platforms with different forms appeared. 32
After 2010
In order to control the risk of municipal debt, in June of 2010, China’s State
Council issued ‘notice on strengthening management issues of local government
financing platform’, calling for rectification of municipal debts by local governments.
Moreover, in July, the China Treasury and other related committees put forward some
implement measures. 33

31

For more information, please see: Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Construction, China People's Bank, China Banking Regulatory Commission. On strengthening macrocontrol, remediation and standardize various bundled loans notice .2006 April.
32
People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission. Guidance of further strengthening
the credit structure adjustment to promote stable and rapid economic development (Yin Jian Fa [2009]
No.92) .2009 March.
33
Shanghai Institute research group of state-owned capital operation. Shanghai local government
investment and financing platform for investment and financing mechanism’s innovation research [J].
Shanghai Administration Institute, May 2012 Volume 13, No. 3, P59-70.
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After 2015
In recent years, the Chinese central government is implementing an
unprecedented budget reform, which is the first significant budget reform since 2000.
Under the new budget law, since 2015, the country's 31 provincial-level administrative
units and five municipalities can issue municipal bonds and do not have to rely on debt
financing through LGFP, which is viewed as a significant change of budget law.
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